Enhanced Marine Oil Spill Response Regime for Southern British Columbia, Canada

Enhanced Marine Oil Spill Response Regime for Southern British Columbia, Canada

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect Aquatic Procedia 3 (2015) 74 – 84 International Oil Spill Response Technical Seminar Enhanc...

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Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

ScienceDirect Aquatic Procedia 3 (2015) 74 – 84

International Oil Spill Response Technical Seminar

Enhanced Marine Oil Spill Response Regime for Southern British Columbia, Canada Bikramjit Kanjilal* Valiance Maritime Consultants Limited, Burnaby, BC, Canada

Abstract Several recent proposals to expand pipeline capacity on the West Coast of Canada have raised concerns about the increased risk of oil spills. This paper discusses how Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC (Trans Mountain) is focusing on continued safe marine transportation of oil from its terminal within Port Metro Vancouver, including its proposal to significantly enhance the area’s oil spill response regime. It references information that is part of the proponent’s application to the National Energy Board (NEB) of Canada and information under review by Transport Canada. The NEB is expected to provide its report and recommendation in early 2016 following a comprehensive review process. © 2014 2015 The byby Elsevier B.V.B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license © The Authors. Authors.Published Published Elsevier (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Peer-review under responsibility of the Scientific Committee of International Oil Spill Response Technical Seminar. Peer-review under responsibility of China Offshore Environmental Services Ltd

Keywords: Canada; oil spill; Transport Canada; tanker safety; spill prevention; spill response; world class

1. Introduction 1.1. National context Although marine transportation of oil, both crude and refined, has taken place in Canada and the U.S. for many decades, several recent proposals to expand pipeline capacity and provide Canadian oil producers access to tide water on the West Coast of Canada have raised concerns about the increased risk of oil spills. In British Columbia, the spectre of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 and its aftermath effects on communities are often discussed. Only a few months before that, a few miles off the coast of Washington state, the barge Nestucca spilled her cargo of heavy bunker fuel after colliding with the tug towing her. The prevailing winds and currents led to the oil reaching

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 604 290 7767. E-mail address: [email protected]

2214-241X © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Peer-review under responsibility of China Offshore Environmental Services Ltd doi:10.1016/j.aqpro.2015.02.230

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the shorelines of Vancouver Island, causing numerous beaches to be oiled and affecting birds, wildlife, and crab and shellfish populations. A number of risk assessments have recently been carried out in Canada. One such assessment, completed on behalf of Transport Canada by WSP, identified the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the St. Lawrence River and the southern coast of British Columbia as the areas at greatest risk from large oil spills. This assessment also highlighted a higher risk of small and medium spills in every region of the country. Smaller spills can also cause significant damage and are likely to happen much more frequently than larger spills. As part of a comprehensive review of Canada’s Ship-source Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Regime, the federal Tanker Safety Expert Panel provided 45 recommendations that the Government of Canada plans to promulgate in an effort to achieve world-class status in tanker safety, spill prevention and spill response. 1.2. Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC (Trans Mountain, TMPL) is a Canadian corporation with its head office located in Calgary, Alberta (AB). The TMPL system began operations 60 years ago and now transports a range of crude oil and petroleum products from Western Canada to locations in central and southwestern British Columbia (BC), Washington state and offshore. The TMPL system has an operating capacity of approximately 47,690 m3/d (300,000 bbl/d), and the expansion will increase capacity to 141,500 m3/d (890,000 bbl/d). The majority of the expanded capacity resulting from the proposed Trans Mountain Expansion Pipeline Project (TMEP) is expected to be filled by a variety of heavy crude oils derived from the Alberta oilsands and destined for export from the Westridge Marine Terminal (Westridge), which is currently a single-berth oil handling facility situated within Port Metro Vancouver (PMV) that is capable of handling Aframax-sized tankers. Servicing the expansion capacity of TMPL will require Westridge to expand into a three-berth dock complex with Aframax capacity, and could lead to a sevenfold increase in future tanker traffic to Westridge by 2018. Trans Mountain does not own or operate tankers. Under the existing laws of Canada, it would not be responsible for costs and liability resulting from a tanker oil spill if such a low-likelihood event were to occur. However, Trans Mountain is very interested in all aspects of safe operations, including marine transportation of oil from Westridge, and has been involved for many years with other industry stakeholders in supporting local initiatives that help improve the area’s marine safety regime. 2. Description 2.1. Study area The major traffic route between PMV and the Pacific Ocean is an established shipping route for all types of vessels. The route begins in Vancouver Harbour and transits the Strait of Georgia, Boundary Pass, Haro Strait and the Juan de Fuca Strait. Locally, this region is also called the Salish Sea. The Straits of Juan de Fuca, Haro Strait and Boundary Pass are considered “international straits” bisected by the United States / Canada international boundary along their entirety, and traffic is managed jointly by the Canadian Coast Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard. The international boundary follows generally parallel and central to the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Strait of Georgia vessel traffic separation zones, as shown in Figure 1. Project tankers will continue to make the 160-nautical mile (290-km) journey using established shipping lanes inbound and outbound to and from the Westridge Marine Terminal (the Route).


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Fig. 1. Study area showing shipping route


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Oil has been carried safely to and from ports and harbours of Canada for many years. The annual amount of oil transported as cargo in Canadian waters over the last 10 years has averaged approximately 289 million tonnes per year (Transport Canada and Nuka Research & Planning Group, LLC — West Coast Spill Response Study, 2013). Of that, only about 6 million tonnes per year (2 per cent) have been transported on the West Coast of Canada. Transport Canada records indicate that there are about 475,000 vessel movements per year on the West Coast, and tankers accounted for about 1,500 movements (0.3 per cent) in 2009 to 2010 (Transport Canada 2013h). Oil tankers have been moving safely and regularly along Canada’s West Coast since the 1930s (Transport Canada 2013h), many destined to U.S. refineries in the Puget Sound area. In fact, the annual amount of oil transported as cargo to and from the U.S. has averaged approximately 37 million tonnes per year for the past 10 years. The active oil transportation network on the West Coast also includes the movement of refined products in barges to and from communities along the West Coast. In the last 10 years, Canada has not experienced any spills over 1,000 m3, and none of these involved the spillage of crude oil. Westridge itself has been handling tankers since the 1950s and currently loads about five Aframax and Panamax tankers per month with export cargo. In its entire history, Westridge has never seen oil spilled from a tanker. 2.2. Risk Assessment Risk is commonly defined as having two components: probability or likelihood of occurrence, and severity of consequences. Controls may be applied either to reduce the likelihood of occurrence of an adverse event or to reduce the severity of the consequences. Trans Mountain decided very early in the process to take a risk-based approach to apply long-term mitigation measures towards both the likelihood and consequences of oil spills. To do so, it was important to understand not only the navigational aspects of marine risk, but also to research cargo oil properties, including its fate and behaviour in the particular marine environment, and then propose any additional steps required to mitigate or reduce the severity of the consequences of an oil spill if such a low-likelihood event were to occur. In addition to completing a detailed environmental and socio-economic risk assessment on the impact of marine transportation, Trans Mountain engaged DNV (Det Norske Veritas) to carry out a quantitative risk assessment related to marine transportation of oil as a result of TMEP, focusing on shipping hazards. The risk assessment considered the entire geographic area between Westridge and the extent of Canada’s territorial seas limit. It considered regional traffic growth, navigational hazards, vessel construction and risk controls provided under the existing safety regime. DNV found that existing risk controls are considered to be state of the art compared to other coastal sailing routes worldwide, and in line with global best practices. These include the traffic separation scheme jointly managed by the coast guard organizations of Canada and the U.S., the use of dual pilots for laden tankers, use of PPUs or personal pilotage units that provide pilots with independent means to maintain positional and situational awareness through the entire passage, and tethered escort tugs that assist or accompany tankers in certain sections of the passage. The report quantified the probability of oil spill incidents and the potential consequences of these incidents in terms of spill volume. These probabilities and consequences were combined to define credible worst-case and mean-case risks. The consequences of an oil cargo spill accident depend on the extent of the damage to the vessel’s hull and the amount of oil that can spill from a vessel. The damage severity and oil outflow modelling shows that the 90th percentile worst-case scenario is the loss of the entire contents of two cargo oil tanks of a partly loaded Aframax tanker to the sea, which gives an oil outflow of approximately 16,500 m3. Such an event is considered the credible worst-case oil spill. The mean-case or the 50th percentile worst-case scenario is the loss of the entire contents of one cargo oil tank to the sea, which gives an oil outflow of approximately 8,250 m3. Based on an assessment of the shipping route, DNV also identified potential locations for accidents. Currently, about 600 tankers call Canadian and US ports in the marine study area annually, constituting about 5.5 per cent of all traffic tracked by AIS, based on nautical miles travelled in the region. Of the total number of tankers, about 40 per cent calls in Canada, including about 60 calls made to Westridge each year. Post-TMEP, tankers would constitute about 8.1 per cent of all traffic tracked by AIS, based on nautical miles travelled in the region and about 41 per cent of future combined regional tanker traffic based on nautical miles travelled.



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DNV’s results show that if TMEP does not proceed, the frequency of accidents involving a TMEP tanker resulting in an oil cargo spill of any size is estimated to be 1 in every 309 years. To mitigate the effects of increased tanker traffic, a number of enhancements are recommended that, if implemented, will raise the level of care and safety in the Salish Sea, in DNV’s view, to well above globally accepted shipping standards. The primary recommendations include extending tug escorts for laden tankers throughout Strait of Georgia and Juan de Fuca Strait and implementing a moving exclusion zone around laden tankers. If TMEP is allowed to proceed with existing and additional proposed risk-reducing measures being implemented, the frequency of oil spills will be 1 in every 237 years. Under these circumstances, the frequency of a credible worst-case oil cargo spill from a project tanker will be 1 in every 2,366 years. DNV also found that overall, when the entire oil transportation marine network for the region is considered, the project (with applied future additional risk-reducing measures) is expected to maintain similar frequency of oil cargo spills of any size. However, the entire route traverses locations with high ecological and environmental values (Figure 2), and the possibility that these areas might ever suffer the consequences of a tanker spill naturally continues to raise concerns. This is reflected in the WSP risk assessment. Though it ranked the likelihood of an oil spill above 1,000 m3 in size in the coastal waters of southern BC as medium, and the likelihood of oil spill above 10,000 m3 in size there as low, it reported that the area is one among only three areas in Canada at greatest risk from large oil spills; based on the probability of occurrence and consequences on the ecology of the region.

Fig. 2. Study area ecological and environmental values

2.3. Oil properties, fate and behaviour As mentioned earlier, the proposed oil cargo is derived from the Alberta oilsands. It is transported in pipelines and tankers as a product known as diluted bitumen or dilbit. Bitumen is highly viscous and is therefore transported after a diluent has been blended with it. Pipeline regulations require the transported product to not exceed density of 0.94 tonnes per m3 and viscosity not to exceed 350 cst. The diluent used is most often condensate, although sometimes lighter crude oils are used. Concerns have been voiced in a number of quarters about the properties of dilbit, that it would separate after loss of containment into bitumen and diluent, leading to bitumen sinking. Although several detailed studies have been completed that characterize the fate and behaviour of heavy crude oil made from Alberta oilsands, most are laboratory and bench-scale tests. Trans Mountain undertook an initiative to expand on this knowledge through larger, meso-scale tests of diluted Alberta oilsands bitumen. This initiative,

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which was designed and managed by Witt O’Brien and Polaris, is referred to as the Gainford study (Volume 8C, TR 8C-12, S7). It employed a series of dedicated tanks where experts could observe the 10-day behaviour of two types of representative diluted bitumen: Cold Lake Winter Blend (CLWB) and Access Western Blend (AWB). Wind and wave generating devices were used to simulate environmental conditions for the study. Salt was added to the water to achieve a salinity of 20 parts per thousand (ppt) to simulate the brackish waters of Burrard Inlet. Water temperature averaged about 15°C. For the two products tested, the most significant changes noted from the 10-day weathering events were in density, viscosity, water uptake, and emulsification and chemistry (light ends). Densities of both products increased at a higher rate over the first 48 hours and then at a much slower rate depending on the amount of wind and agitation applied (Figures 3 and 4). Over the 10-day period, AWB exceeded the density of freshwater after 8 days and, except for one instance under moderate agitation, the density of CLWB remained less than that of freshwater throughout the 10-day test period. No oil was found at the bottom of the test tanks upon completion of the tests.

Fig. 3. Density change due to weathering of AWB

Fig. 4. Density change due to weathering of CLWB

Viscosity of both products rose quickly in the first 48 hours and reached over 100,000 cst within 4 days. Both products exhibited water uptake within the weathered oil matrix, although not as a stable, uniform emulsion but rather as a mechanically mixed and unstable oil-water combination. The maximum water contents measured, above 40 per cent, were noted after 1 to 3 days of weathering in samples from three tanks with moderate and mild agitation. Most crude oil contains BTEX (benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes) — usually from about 0.5 per cent to 5



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per cent or more. The CLWB and AWB contain approximately 1 per cent BTEX in the fresh oil samples, consistent with other crude oils. Gasoline can contain up to 40 per cent BTEX. BTEX compounds are volatile and rapidly volatilize, producing a net loss of BTEX compounds. Within the water column, BTEX diminished rapidly within 48 hours and TPH (total petroleum hydrocarbons) only exceeded the detection limit (2 mg/L) during the first 48 hours in tanks with moderate surface agitation. Light hydrocarbon emission rates declined by >80 per cent in 6 hours; emissions of all combined chemical groups declined by >80 per cent after 12 hours and >90 per cent after 3.4 days. Testing of alternative means of oil spill response, including the use of dispersants and in-situ burning showed limited efficacy; however, shoreline cleaning agents were seen to be effective on weathered product. No performance shortcomings were observed in the current inventory of recovery equipment available to Trans Mountain and the regional marine spill response organization. 2.4. Oil spill modelling The waters between Vancouver Island and the mainland and the interconnecting channels form a deep, topographically complex and strongly tidal estuarine system. Freshwater from the Fraser River, as well as other rivers draining into these waters, provides a driving force for a strong estuarine circulation, which leads to a seaward set to currents along the bulk of the shipping route. This estuarine circulation persists out onto the continental shelf, aided by additional fresh water from the Columbia River. An accidental oil spill from a TMEP-related tanker in transit would be expected to spread and move away from the spill site, depending on local currents and driven by winds, tides and estuarine circulation, and to hit shorelines quite quickly. At this stage, EBA Tetra Tech carried out stochastic spill modelling for several of the DNV-identified potential locations for accidents. Both credible worstcase and average-case spills were modelled at four locations along the route (Figure 5). In addition, hypothetical spills during oil cargo transfer were modelled at Westridge. The spill model incorporated various factors unique to the region, including topography, bathymetry, climate, seasonal meteorology, wind and wave patterns, salinity, tidal flows and heights, proximity of land and the complexity of currents at the sites. The model also incorporated the information gleaned from the Gainford study. The fraction evaporated is relatively constant for all four sites. The amount remaining on the water surface is much less at the inshore sites because of the close proximity of shorelines. The dissolved fraction is larger at Buoy J at the limit of Canada’s territorial sea, possibly because the flow and winds are more unidirectional, so the slick is always moving over new water that has not been exposed to the dissolved constituents. This would lead to an increased mass transfer rate at the oil-water interface. 2.5. Oil spill response The results of oil spill modelling make it clear that, to be effective, the response regime needs to ensure quick response and consider issues specific to the location, consequences of the oceanographic and meteorological factors in the area, and consequences of the particular characteristics of the transported product. Also, response capacity for the region should consider the larger amounts of crude oil transported on tankers servicing other oil handling facilities in the region. Regulation of marine oil spill response is primarily defined in the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 and is administered by Transport Canada. The Act requires oil spill response organizations to be certified by the Minister, requires all large vessels and oil handling facilities to have an arrangement with a certified response organization as a condition of operating in Canadian waters, and establishes planning standards that define minimum levels of capacity to be maintained by the response organization. Western Canada Marine Response Corporation (WCMRC) is the response organization for the West Coast. Current planning standards require capacity to respond to oil spills of up to 10,000 tonnes in specified time frames that in some cases allow up to 72 hours plus travel time to deliver response equipment. WCMRC currently maintains capacity significantly in excess of the minimum planning standards.

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Fig. 5. Hypothetical oil spill locations

Fig. 6. Mass balance results of oil spill modelling at Arachne Reef

Fig. 7. Mass balance results of oil spill modelling at Buoy J



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Based on analysis of the important information from the navigation risk assessment, Gainford and oil spill modelling, WCMRC was requested to develop a spill response regime to adequately and effectively address consequences of any TMEP-related oil spill, even though such spills remain only low-likelihood events. The response regime proposed will be capable of delivering 20,000 tonnes of capacity within 36 hours, with dedicated resources staged within the study area. This represents a response capacity that is double and a delivery time that is half the existing planning standards. These enhancements will reduce times for initiating a response to 2 hours for the harbour and 6 hours for the remainder of the study area and parts of the west coast of Vancouver Island. Reduced times will be achieved by creating new base locations along the tanker route. Meeting the response capacities within the designated times requires redundancy of equipment. As a result, the overall capacity of dedicated response equipment resident in the area will be in excess of 30,000 tonnes. Also, based on the increased shoreline oiling identified by the spill modelling, the recommendation from WCMRC is to have the means to deal with more shoreline cleaning—that is, to increase the existing shoreline cleaning standard from 500 m/day to 3,000 m/day for this region. Should the project be approved, Trans Mountain shall support such a response regime being established in the Salish Sea. The efficacy of the proposed spill response regime was tested by a computer simulation that showed the benefits of developing and establishing a risk-based, area-focused oil spill response plan supported by additional oil spill response bases located in close proximity to the shipping route. 3. Communication Communication has been a key part of Trans Mountain’s strategy. It is worth commenting that when it comes to such emotive issues as oil spills, there is clearly no established benchmark of acceptable risk. Oil spills are extremely low-likelihood events in most parts of the world, and especially in Canada, as shown by the records. What constitutes acceptable risk varies between individuals and is often based on personal values, opinions and perceived worst-case consequence. It was therefore important to provide all stakeholders with transparent insight into the proponent’s commitment towards safeguarding the values and environmental treasures of the coastal communities of southern BC. Listening to communities and First Nations to understand their concerns and interests has played an important role in finding answers and recommending mitigations. Throughout, Trans Mountain has demonstrated its commitment to listen and understand the feedback of communities by conducting research on important issues (at considerable cost), then discussing the findings with stakeholders so that, together, long-term mitigation steps could be found. This approach has also helped the proponent provide fact and research-based information and counteracts some degree of misinformation and hearsay that is often a factor in such circumstances. 4. Approach Benefits A comprehensive risk-based approach to project planning, developed on a foundation of clear principles, is a powerful strategy for effectively addressing many practical challenges of carrying out major undertakings such as the Trans Mountain Expansion Pipeline Project. When a risk-based approach is supported by a communication platform that is both credible and transparent, communities and stakeholders see opportunity to influence issues in a manner that helps address their concerns, and this sometimes leads to building grassroots support for these types of projects. After recognizing the sincerity of the proponent’s approach, several coastal communities and First Nations have expressed their willingness to collaborate on mutually beneficial aspects such as developing spill response facilities close to the shipping route. The proponent and WCMRC are involved in a number of these discussions. A collaborative approach that builds relationships with all stakeholders, including communities and agencies, has more chance of success than an approach based purely on business imperatives.

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5. Changes to Regulations in Canada Following a review in the early 1990s and informed by international developments, the Government of Canada, in collaboration with industry, developed a regime based on a public-private partnership. Three legal instruments form the basis of the current regime: Part 8 of the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, the Response Organization and Oil Handling Facilities Regulations, and the Environmental Response Arrangements Regulations. The Canadian Coast Guard oversees the private sector’s response to spills. A federal Tanker Safety Expert Panel reviewed the current regime and published its findings in December 2013, including 45 recommendations. World-Class Tanker Safety in Canada: Recently the Government of Canada announced new measures that, once implemented, will achieve a world-class tanker safety system in Canada. These measures build on recommendations from the Tanker Safety Expert Panel and other studies, and have been informed by engagement with provincial governments, Aboriginal groups, marine stakeholders and internal analysis by federal departments and agencies. Aside from promising more stringent inspection and enforcement programs and implementing modern technological means to improve navigation safety, among the key measures is a commitment towards a more flexible oil spill regime that is area focused and requires oil spill response organizations to develop response plans that take into account location-specific issues, including environmental complexities within each specified region. There is a commitment to continued research into oil properties and its fate and behaviour, and to remove the current legislative impediments to alternative forms of oil spill response such as the use of dispersants and in-situ burning. Most importantly, oil spill liability and compensation will be modified to remove the liability ceiling of Canada’s Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund. If admissible claims for a major spill exhaust the Fund’s current reserve, a mechanism should be in place to allow the Fund to continue to process claims while the government reinstates levies with which to replenish the Fund, in effect making the ‘polluter pays’ principle of Canada among the strongest in the world. 6. Conclusions The expression ‘world class’ is often a worthy objective, but without a clear definition, can mean many things to many people. To the author, it means taking a path of continuous improvement on a journey to excellence. It is the author’s opinion that, to be effective, world class goes beyond a single person or organization and, especially in an area as important as tanker safety and prevention and response to oil spills, requires the involvement and committed participation of all those involved in the field of marine transportation. While the various responsible agencies of the Government of Canada and organizations such as Trans Mountain, WCMRC and others are doing their part, for this to be successful, all stakeholders, including the public, oil shippers, the many different maritime organizations, tanker owners and tanker operators must all become involved. Aside from the robust and comprehensive risk-based approach described earlier, Trans Mountain, as part of its existing Westridge operations, has a robust tanker acceptance standard already in place and a procedure to screen and inspect all tankers destined to the terminal. The tankers are always pre-boomed before any oil is transferred, and a loading master is assigned to every tanker and remains on board throughout its time at the dock. Trans Mountain has the right under its agreement with oil shippers to reject tankers that do not meet the published standards. These practices will continue whether the project proceeds or not. If the project proceeds, the standards will be further bolstered with additional requirements, such as the need for untethered escort tugs to accompany laden tankers for sections of the shipping route where this is not currently a requirement. It now becomes incumbent on oil shippers nominating tankers to Westridge to also do their part to ensure that assigned tankers have been chartered not solely based on commercial measures, but also after having been checked to see that the vessel and its owner/operator meets the high standards recommended by reputable tanker organizations such as the OCIMF and INTERTANKO. Tanker operators should be aware that the authorities, local communities and Trans Mountain expect that only best operating practices will be applied at every stage of the



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tanker’s journey in Canadian waters. For this purpose, oil shippers and tanker owners may wish to consider establishing long-term binding relationships that include clear success and performance criteria. In conclusion, the first steps on the journey to world class have been taken, but much remains to be done, and success will depend on all stakeholders working together to achieve a common goal. Acknowledgements The author would like to acknowledge Trans Mountain for allowing him to work on this study, with a special thanks to Mr. Michael Davies, Kinder Morgan Canada. References Aurelien Hospital, James A. Stronach, M.W. McCarthy, Mark Johncox, 2014. Spill Response Plan Evaluation Using an Oil Spill Model. Det Norske Veritas, 2013. Termpol 3.15, General Risk Analysis and Intended Methods of Reducing Risks, Trans Mountain Expansion Project. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, represented by the Minister of Transport, 2013. A Review of Canada’s Ship-source Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Regime — Setting the Course for the Future. Tetra Tech EBA, 2013. Report: Stochastic and Deterministic Oil Spill Numerical Modelling for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project. Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC, Canada, 2013. Trans Mountain Expansion Project, An Application Pursuant to Section 52 of the National Energy Board Act, December 2013, Volume 8a, Marine Transportation. Western Canada Marine Response Corporation, 201. Report: Review of Trans Mountain Expansion Project, Future Oil Spill Response Approach Plan, Recommendations on Bases and Equipment. Witt O’Brien’s, Polaris Applied Sciences, and Western Canada Marine Response Corporation, 2013. A Study of Fate and Behaviour of Diluted Bitumen Oils on Marine Waters, Dilbit Experiments – Gainford Alberta. WSP Canada, 2013. Risk Assessment for Marine Spills in Canadian Waters.