Foreign policy and European identity

Foreign policy and European identity

History of European Ideas, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 485--498, 1995 Pergamon 0191-6599 (95) [email protected]@31-3 Copyright © 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Grea...

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History of European Ideas, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 485--498, 1995

Pergamon

0191-6599 (95) [email protected]@31-3

Copyright © 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0191-6599/95 $9.50 + 00

FOREIGN POLICY AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY* EDELGARD M A H A N T t

ABSTRACT The paper relates the concept of a European political identity to the development of the European Community's foreign policy. After a brief review of the idea of political identity as it developed in Europe over the last five centuries, the paper relates this concept to that of liberal democracy. It then turns to the European Community and the growth of its foreign policy. It addresses two questions: Could the concept of political loyalty to a territorially defined identity be replaced by that of institutional loyalty to not one, but a variety of overlapping institutions? Secondly, can the development of the European Community's foreign policy contribute to the development of a European sense of identity? Two short case studies, one on Yugoslavia, and one on economic aid to Eastern Europe, illustrate recent European Community foreign policy. The paper concludes with some speculations as to the future European political system and its applicability to other parts of the world. A stronger international presence for Western Europe was one of the prime reasons for the creation of the European Communities in 1957, but until 1989 such a 'foreign policy' consisted only of commercial policy and pronouncements about world events. With the liberation of Eastern Europe, the Community has begun to practice foreign policy. It has, at the same time, been engaged in a major constitution and institution-building effort. From the Single European Act to the Maastricht Treaty, Community leaders are attempting to create a more integrated political system, one which does not entirely resemble the political system of existing nation-states. When scholars try to analyze the present or predict the future, they are limited by their knowledge of the past. The past constitutes a valuable laboratory from which to draw examples to match contemporary developments, but the past also limits our ability to predict the future. We tend to interpret current events in terms of historical patterns. In Europe, this often means that we compare the growth and development of the European Community to that of nation-states. In the 1950s and 1960s, enthusiasts for a united Europe spoke and wrote about a 'United States of Europe' (Monnet, 412-417). They envisaged the growth of a West European state, which would unite Europe just as the United States, Canada, Germany or Italy had been formed from separate units. Karl Deutsch (1968), studied the formation of

*This paper was presented at the Third Conference of the ISSEI, on European Integration and the European Mind, at Aalborg University, Denmark, 24-29 August 1992, in the workshop on 'National and European Identity', chaired by Prof. B.E. Jensen. tGlendon College, York University, Toronto, Canada. 485

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modem nation-states and tried to apply similar models to a united Europe. Another American scholar, Ernest B. Haas, countered that the European Community was sui generis, that its supranational system need not develop to the point where it would resemble that of a nation-state (E. Haas, 1958). Yet even today many continue to see the Community as a nascent state. Le Monde of December 19, 1991 mentions a recent French language book about the Community entitled, Naissance d'une Nation (author Yann de L'Ecotais, publisher Grasset). The Commission's delegate to Germany wrote in 1992 that East European governments should be asked to accept 'the goal of political integration leading to the United States of Europe' (Langguth). This article moves beyond the nation-state analogy and situates the European Community in the network of overlapping national and supranational institutions which may constitute the political system of the twenty-first century. After a brief review of the characteristics of the nation-state system, it describes the emerging supranational political system, discusses its relationship to the ideals of liberalism and democracy, then turns to the European Community as an example of a nascent supranational system. A brief review of Community policies towards Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia illustrates one aspect of the operation and growth of this political system.

THE NATION-STATE SYSTEM The nation-state system which reached its European apogee in 1919 formed a suitable counterpart to the Newtonian physical universe. Nationalist thinkers such as Mazzini and Woodrow Wilson assumed that individuals had a natural national identity, and that people would prefer to live in a community of persons of a similar identity. That community would become the basic unit of the political system, and that unit would in turn have exclusive control of a piece of territory (E. Haas, 1986). Each person would have only one nationality and one political allegiance, and all of the earth's territory would be divided among sovereign governments, each of which had exclusive control over the area it controlled. It is no Coincidence that the concepts of a world of nation-states and of democracy gained widespread acceptance at about the same time, since a nation gives its members an identity which supersedes that of aristocrat, bourgeois or peasant (Hobsbawn, 20, 39). It did not take long for the two concepts to fuse and to produce a powerful idea, that of national self-determination (Etzioni; Deutsch, 1969, 17; Deutsch, 1980, 653). Self-determination means not only that people have a right to 'decide their fate' (Deutsch, 1980), but also that they have the right to a piece territory, in short national sovereignty (Gellner, 1; Kohn, 17-19). The concept of a world of nation-states was harnessed to solve other political problems. Percipient observers have long realized that it is habit or obligation and not the threat of force which allows political systems to function with a minimal amoum of disorder. Political thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, used the social contract to explain why people accept political authority (Kohn, 3). Nineteenth and twentieth century nationalists applied a variation of the social contract theory: people were willing to accept the authority of government because

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they could identify with it as their national government (Deutsch, 1969, 17). Ernest Haas (1986) summarizes this thinking:

Successful nationalism.., implies a minimum of social harmony... Legitimate authority under conditions of mass politics is tied up with successful nationalism; when the national identity is in doubt, one prop supporting legitimacy is knocked away. The idea of a world of nation-states was so powerful in its simplicity that it did not take long for the European mind to hop from description to prescription. If not all the world's territory formed part of nation-states and if there were individuals who did not have a primary national allegiance, then that situation ought to be rectified by giving every individual a national allegiance and every territory its sovereign government. Hence the ideas that every former colony enjoyed a right to national self-determination, and that every individual should be taught to identify with a nation-state--the concept of nation-building (Birch, 40-46). The United Nations Charter gives an ideal description of an international system, consisting of nation-states, which are in turn subject to a minimal common international standards and joint enforcement of those standards. The nation-states of this ideal world relate to each other through the practice of foreign policy. Foreign policy allows nation-states to conduct business among each other, but it is also an expression of national identity (Haas, 1986; Stairs). Each state practices the foreign policy which reflects its national interest and identity; foreign policy helps to consolidate the functional and the normative identification of citizens with the nation-state.

A POST-NATION-STATE WORLD

Globalization has become a catch-word of the 1990s. Conservatives believe that we must submit to automatic global forces whereas left-wing nationalists (G. Laxer, 1992) want to retum to the womb of the nation-state. Both are wrong. Conservatives are wrong to describe globalization in terms of automatic forces. Decisions to locate an industry or cut a forest, to sell, buy, employ or fire are human decisions made for various motivations, of which the desire for profit is only one (Williams; 1992). Protectionist nationalists are wrong because it is not only economic forces but also the force of ideas which has created the post-nationalism world. Economic (and not just trade) protectionism is practical, though the economic loss increases sharply with the degree of protectionism; ideas, however, cannot be kept out, and indeed are essential if an economy and society are not to stagnate. It is one of the ironies of history that whereas it is mainly ideas which cause people to act, the complex interplay of human actions may create situations which destroy the validity of a system of ideas (an ideology) just as that ideology reaches its widest acceptance. Thus has it been with nationalism and the nation-state system. In the 1960s, when the United Nations General Assembly was adopting

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declarations on the inherent right to self-determination, the global economy and communications system were beginning to undermine the foundations of that system. By 1992, it is clear to all but the most ardent old-fashioned nationalists that the system is beyond repair. On the one hand, global movements of money, goods and people have created a world economy which no national government can hope to control (Harris, 168-9, 190-3), while the mass media are spreading ideas to every part of our earth. Buzan (366) contrasts 'the deeply parochial quality of the several hundred ethno-cultural societies into which history has divided humankind' with the 'profoundly cosmopolitan quality of the recently emergent international society.' One of the dominant ideas of this society is that of liberal democracy. The idea that people have a right to control their own lives, to enjoy some autonomy and freedom and to choose their government has struck a powerful chord in human nature. Though by no means universally accepted (witness the rise of Islamic and to a lesser extent of Christian fundamentalism), the idea of democracy, combined with the insecurity engendered by technological, economic and cultural changes has caused large numbers of people to seek refuge in their traditional national cultures (Drohan, 1991; Williams 1992). Hence the paradox of ever smaller nations seeking self-determination while global influences (economic and cultural) no longer allow the governments of even the largest existing nation-states to control events and thus meet the needs and expectations of their people. John Stuart Mill (362) was the first of many political thinkers to claim national self-determination as a necessary condition for democracy and self-government, but there is not necessarily a connection between these two ideals. In many cases, the achievement of self-determination has led to the abandoning of democracy, often on the excuse that national security or development required a strong government. If a global economy and global ideologies have made national sovereignty impractical (Etzioni, 1982), the future success of democracy may require us to delink these two concepts, so that democracy can persist even if nationalism fades (Kohn, 574--6). So how can people whom democratic ideology has taught that they have a right to control their lives exercise such control in the age of a global economy and culture? (Some would say regional, but transnational, economies and cultures (Breton)). The answer may lie in a society of multi-layered or segmented institutions (Toffler, 456--463; Weidenfeld and Janning) where 1) each individual identifies with a number of institutions (Mulhall), 2) these institutions are not necessarily territorially defined. This is not new; political scientists have long known about 'cross-cutting cleavages' (Etzioni; Whitaker). The difference between cross-cutting cleavages and a future multi-layered society is that political control will also be segmented, so that one or two sets of institutions may be responsible for physical security, others will control various aspects of the economy, yet others will deal with social, cultural or educational policy? Modem technology and communications will allow institutions to coordinate their activities and enable astute political leaders to infuse the system with overall values and guidelines. 2 The Maastricht Treaty, which provides that the general principles of a Community foreign policy will be decided unanimously by the member states, whereas the Council will decide specific measures by majority votes, provides one example of how such a system might function.

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Of the many objections that the above prediction will no doubt provoke, I will anticipate only one" human nature will find such a complex world unsatisfying: people need a primary identity (Williams). Yet it has long been a truism of federalism that individuals need to feel a loyalty to at least two levels of government (Wheare, 49; Whitaker). The future may see not only a learning of multiple identities, but also a realization that political identities are not necessarily territorially based. Or as Le Monde Diplomatique (Dec. 1991) put it, 'peut-on se sentir citoyen d'un grand marche?' Jim Laxer (1991, 304) sees the post-national state as the political equivalent of the multinational corporation; it need not be limited to one culture or one nationality and thus could not be accused of practising imperialism against other nationalities. The kind of rationality which would allow individuals to identify with several political units may become possible at a time when satellites beam information across continents and events in far away countries of which we know little (pace Neville Chamberlain) can affect every day lives• Pierre Trudeau writes: •.. there is some hope that in advanced societies, the glue of nationalism will become as obsolete as the divine right of kings; the title of the state to govern and the extent of its authority will be conditional upon rational justification . . . . If politicians must bring emotion into the act, let them get emotional about functionalism. (196) This writer holds that contemporary Europe is the first, best example of the future multi-layered, segmented political system and that the European Community constitutes the core of that system. By adopting the principle of 'subsidiarity', the Community accepts that political decisions can emanate from various levels of government, that even specific types of decisions, such as competition policy, can come from different levels, depending on the nature of the issue. At least one scholar has devised a scheme for the division of powers within a new panEuropean, but otherwise non-territorially based, political system. Toulemon includes the European Community, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe in his plans. In such a political system, foreign policy would appear to be one of the issue areas which would continue to emanate from the traditional, territorial political system since in the semi-anarchy of the international system, where the projection of power may be a significant determinant of success, the larger, wealthier Community would be a more suitable foreign policy actor than the individual member states. But the nature of foreign policy is changing. Most issues with which governments deal, from culture to the environment to education, now have a foreign policy aspect. Many 'foreign' threats, such as terrorism and secession, now come from within (Williams, 1992). In the Community, security and commerce, have dominated the foreign policy, but now Europeans are debating whether security is still an issue, while immigration and the environment, have appeared on the foreign policy agenda. The traditional, security-related aspects of foreign policy would logically belong to the European level of decision-making. In commercial policy, strength is a useful negotiating tool, but here the complex transnational network of multinational finns, research consortia (for example, the European Space Agency) and media 'empires'

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defy control by any existing political organization. Only new types of political institutions, perhaps ad hoc coalitions, employee-management cooperation or association of interested persons could impose democratic control on these groupings. Nevertheless, commercial policy has retained a firm territorial base. The European Community can prevent the import of Japanese fax paper or American soybeans. This is less true of the movement of services, money, persons and environmental pollution. The rest of this paper will attempt an empirical exploration of one layer of the new multi-layered European institutional structure, that of the foreign policy making and implementation segment of the European Community. The purpose of the investigation will be to determine the extent to which the functioning of this segment has contributed to the creation of a European foreign policy identity, that is 1) the extent to which as a foreign policy actor the European Community is acting like a traditional nation-state and/or as a supranational actor, and 2) the extent to which Europeans have begun to identify with this new foreign policy actor.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE YUGOSLAVIAN CIVIL WARS The Community involved itself in Yugoslavia not only because the member governments wanted it to, but also because of a request from the Conference (now Council) on Security and Cooperation in Europe. No longer a conference but a nascent international and transnational organization, the CSCE itself constitutes a good example of the institutions of the post-nation state era ('A Month'). When the Yugoslavian crisis became acute, at the end of June 1991, Community heads of government were in Luxembourg for their semi-annual summit. Since then, the Community has attempted to mediate, has tried to observe the (non-existent) peace, has imposed economic sanctions and, finally, decided to refer part of its responsibilities to the United Nations. As of October 1992, there was a tacit division of labour, whereby the UN tried to impose and observe a peace and the Community continues to mediate (though the UN has attempted some mediation and the Community has sent in observers). Nevertheless, in May 1992, the Community intensified economic sanctions before the UN Security Council did likewise. In Yugoslavia, the Community is not defending a traditional national interest. It had no major markets to protect, and there was no immediate threat of the conflict spreading over the boundaries of the former state, though the possibility of largescale migration which appeared later does pose a threat to the Community and its members. The interests the Community has been defending are of the diffuse, postnational type. Chaos and disintegration in Yugoslavia could spread to other European states, most of them not Community members (though the Czech-Slovak problem cannot be blamed on the Yugoslavian demonstration effect). The Community's initial involvement was rather based on a sense of responsibility and a feeling of pride: the Community ought to be able to handle this problem; according to Edouard BaUadur 'comment pourrions-nous rester les bras crois6s

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alors que le feu est aux portes de l'Europe?' (cited in Amalric). Europeans, others argued, ought no longer to resort to primitive military means to settle their conflicts, and the Community had an obligation to promote such standards of behaviour. The Community's member states having eliminated war among each other, should show its neighbours how to keep the peace (Fontaine). So the Community provided mediators and sent in unarmed observers. The mediators are still working, without success, and the observers were shot at. Six of them have been killed. When it became obvious that the Community could not handle the problem, Belgium, Britain and France, on behalf of the Community, put the Yugoslavian question on the agenda of the Security Council. The resolution which the Council adopted on September 25, 1991, was the first UN resolution to mention the European Community ('U.N. Resolution'). It expressed 'full support' for the Community's efforts and began a process of escalating sanctions against the warring republics. The UN was no more successful than the Community. The bloodshed continues. As an illustration of the politics of post-national Europe, the Yugoslavian crisis is, nevertheless, significant. The European Community assumed and exercised a primary responsibility for the affairs of a part of Europe outside its boundaries. European Council resolutions stated the principles on which the Community expected a Yugoslavian settlement to be based: observance of human and minority rights and of territorial boundaries unless there was peaceful agreement to do otherwise, democrati~tion and economic reforms (Lucron, 8-10). That the Community failed in its efforts means neither the failure nor the end of the Community's foreign policy (no more than the failure of the UN's efforts mean the end of the UN as an international peacekeeper). It means only that that part of Europe has not yet reached the stage of history achieved by most of the rest of the continent. The example of Spain shows that international contacts and the transfer of information can lead to the rapid transformation of a political culture. It seems likely that most of Europe west of the former Soviet Union resembles the Spanish rather than the Yugoslavian model. The European Community may soon be responsible for peace and security throughout Europe and should need only minimal military means to fulfil that role. That is why the French pressure for a European military force may be misguided. The instruments of the Community's foreign policy will be primarily economic and diplomatic. In Yugoslavia it used both positive and negative economic and diplomatic sanctions. In spite of some differences among its members, the Community now has a distinct foreign policy role. It has specific responsibilities for Europe as a whole, a fact which the American government, the CSCE and the United Nations Security Council have recognized. The Community's only serious rival for this responsibility is the nascent CSCE organization. Most important, however, for a Community foreign policy identity have been highly publicized operations such as the carrying of aid to Vukovar and the death of Community observers. Such incidents, though they may not resolve the conflict, have done much to create awareness of the Community. An analysis of the resulting press coverage would constitute an interesting future study.

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THE COMMUNITY AID TO EASTERN EUROPE If Community policy towards Yugoslavia has been motivated largely by the goals of the post-national interest era, the same cannot be said of policy towards Eastern Europe generally. Here there is a clear duality of motives. On the one hand, there are traditional national interests writ large at the Community level, such as the search for markets and profitable investments. On the other hand, there is the desire for aggrandizement of the Community - - t o remake Eastern Europe in its image, with social market economies and democratic political systems. There is a symbiotic relationship between these two sets of goals. The interest goals, such as the opening of markets, are inextricably tied to the identity goals, such as social market economies. To what extent does Community policy towards Eastern Europe reflect the assertion of a European Community identity as against the assertion of the Community's 'national' interest? The political goals of Community policy on Eastern Europe are largely of the identity/assertion type. Community statements on Eastern Europe have insisted on the need to protect human rights, to respect the rule of law, to hold free elections and establish multi-party systems, in short a legal framework similar to that of the Community and its member states (Commission, 254; Langguth; Laursen; Pelk.mans and Murphy). While some of these goals would facilitate investment and trade and while stability benefits the continent as a whole, most of these goals are of the identity/assertion type. According to the Community's Ottawa office: The European Community and its member States, thanks to shared traditions and culture, are uniquely placed to help their Eastern neighbours on the way to democracy. The EC also serves as a model for bringing market-driven economic policies to the Eastern part of the continent. (European Community News, Oct. 8,1991) If the Community Were a nation-state, these goals could almost be termed imperialistic. Since it is not, they strengthen the identity of the Community, confirm the rightness of its political system and boost the ego the Community's leaders. Listen to Roland Dumas, France's long-serving foreign minister, evaluate the Community's role: grande puissance, elle doit d6sormais 8tre partie prenante dans tousles grands sujets de politique internationale qui int6resse la paix et Ia prospefit6 du monde et les siennes par voie de cons6quence. Such power will come not only from the Community's role and image, but also from the outward radiation of its identity which, says the European Commission, will create a 'feeling of belonging' among East as well as West Europeans (Europe (Brussels), Sept. 7, 1991). Community goals which relate to the economic system of Eastern Europe are about equally divided between the identity and the national-interest component. Goals such as the promotion of the private sector, a market economy and a reduction of state influence benefit Community enterprises, but they serve also to

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remake Eastern Europe in the Western image. Several of the aims of the PHARE programme (Commission, 255) and of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, such as the modernization of infrastructure, privatization, and research on environment and health, fit into this category. Thirdly, there are the goals of Community policy towards Eastern Europe which are of the national interest variety. These include the securing of markets, outlets for capital, political stability and a Community 'sphere of influence' which will help to assure its future influence and prosperity. According to an official of the German Foreign Office: The envisaged accession of the Central and Southeast European states to the EC will increase the supply of goods with intermediate technology . . . . The integration . . . . therefore, can only be successful if Western Europe phases out old industries . . . . This presupposes that Europe's technologically advanced states switch to the new industries of the information age (Ammon). The best evidence that West Europeans see Eastern Europe as a source of raw materials can be found in the European Energy Charter, by which all European countries, Canada and the US have declared an intention to share their energy resources in times of shortage. Aimed primarily aimed at the states of the former Soviet Union, it includes all European countries. Both political and business leaders in the Community see Eastern Europe as a profitable potential market and a place to invest. They talk about the development of the financial sector and free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, though they down play the last one (Commission, 255; Laursen). The means Community leaders have chosen to carry out their programs in Eastern Europe confirm the mixture of interest and identity motives. There was an early emphasis on exchange and training of professionals (the TEMPUS programme), followed by political and cultural cooperation as well as specific types of technical assistance with, for example, privatization, environment and the modernization of infrastructure. Programmes of economic assistance have also served to make the Community known among its own people and elsewhere. In July 1989, the G-7 industrial leaders asked the Community to coordinate Western aid to Eastern Europe. The Community has since been responsible for the coordination and execution of most Western aid. This serves to put the Community in the news, at least in the technical and financial press, and makes it known in Eastern Europe. The EBRD, for example, which includes all of the G-24, the Eastern European countries and the former Soviet states at first blush appears to be primarily a Community institution. When the Bank was set up, it was the Dutch, the French and the British who vied for the top posts and offices. Linguists might want to investigate how the Community seems to appropriate to itself anything which contains the word 'European'. Community experts, for example, dubbed the three agreements which the Community signed with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in December 1991 'European' agreements. The disappearance of the Soviet Union allows the Community to dominate the continent, at least for the time being; its own leadership and policies have promoted dominance.

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ELITE AND PUBLIC OPINION ON COMMUNITY FOREIGN POLICY A thorough survey of elite opinion in the Community countries would include a systematic analysis of newspaper coverage in member countries. What follows is a mere sprinkling of views from three member states? Let us start with a British reaction to the Community's involvement in Yugoslavia: the Community is playing it rather well. It reacted with a speed that many thought was beyond it. . . . The Community has shown.., that it can also lead. It is the main potential peacemaker, ahead of the lumbering... CSCE, ahead of the introverted Soviet Union, ahead even of the United States. ('In from the Wings') Paul Fabra, writing in Le Monde of December 10, 1991, is less lyrical but equally emphatic. He concludes that neither direct elections nor the concept of political union has given Europeans 'le sentiment qu'elles appartiennent ~ une m6me espace politique', but that C'est sur leur capacit6 ~t r6soudre les questions de politique vis-h-vis du monde ext6rieur qu'on va juger l'aptitude des Douze ii se comporter en membres d'une v6ritable union politique en gestation. In Germany, GUnther Nonnenmacher, writing in the Frankfurter Allgemeine of August 15, 1991, is cautious. He sees the Community's intervention in Yugoslavia as a test for the Community's ability to conduct a foreign policy and 'to bring about European political union.' Sir Leon Brittan, as befits a member of the European Commission is more enthusiastic. He discusses the need for a common foreign and security policy and continues: the E.C. is a unique, and a uniquely successful experiment in collaboration and common decision-making between independent democratic countries . . . . the Community represents an important model of how sovereignty can be pooled without diluting national pride or regional identity. If there are members of the elite who find a new European identity in the practice of Community foreign policy, the public seems almost as enthusiastic. Over two-thirds of Community citizens favour a common foreign policy, a percentage that has been increasing slightly over the last three years. 4 Support for a common foreign policy is highest among Italians, the Dutch and the Belgians; lowest among the Portuguese, the Danes and the Greeks. Surprisingly, the picture is much more mixed with respect to defence policy. Here we see an up and down pattern, with only about half of Community citizens favouring a common defence policy; the percentage was somewhat higher during the Gulf crisis. The Community's involvement in Eastern Europe appears to have had some impact on identification with a common foreign policy, in June 1990, more than two-thirds of Community citizens thought that the changes in Eastern Europe ought to lead to faster European integration. Particularly interesting is the fact that there was a doubling of the awareness of Community involvement in Yugoslavia from

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September to October 1991, when the Community observers were deployed. The Dutch and the Germans were most aware of Community involvement in Yugoslavia, which would appear to indicate that levels of education rather than geographical proximity increased awareness. This could be a sign that post-national educated elites are most familiar with developments whereas territorial nearness plays a lesser role.

CONCLUSIONS As an example of a future segmented, multi-layered overlapping network of political systems, the European Community's foreign policy is a good one. The Community is responsible primarily for economic policy for all of Europe; it has a lesser responsibility towards the Mediterranean and Africa. With respect to the rest of the world, national foreign policies tend to dominate, except for commercial policy. So there is not only a functional separation, foreign policy here, commercial policy there, but a segmentation of foreign policy itself. What is more the informed public in Western Europe is aware of the Community's foreign policy activities. Will this awareness lead to identification, to acceptance of the fact that certain types of policy are now Community policies, so that in future people will expect action from the Community? That may happen, but is not yet certain that it will be the case. Public acceptance of a Community security policy is lower than that of a foreign economic policy; on immigration, the acceptance level is lower yet. As foreign policy moves to politically more sensitive areas, there may be a flight back to the shelter of the traditional national governments. Nevertheless, certain fields of competence, such as economic policy for all of Europe and possibly security policy are likely to remain Community responsibilities and will thus become broadly accepted as part of the governmental framework for the continent. Environmental issues may also become a Community responsibility. Will----or can--such a multi-layered system develop in other parts of the world and perhaps for the world as a whole? The advocates of technological selfdetermination would respond with an enthusiastic 'yes', but since it is people who apply technology, the future of the world political system is much less certain. There is a tendency towards regional cooperation (ASEAN) and regional trade blocs (the putative NAFTA, Caribbean Basin Initiative and Enterprise for the Americas), (Mahant), but these trade blocs may not become new political systems; they may continue to be examples of intergovemmental cooperation. Buzan (367, 379) envisages a variety of international regimes interacting in a complex successor to the balance of power system; he calls this system 'mature anarchy'. His vision, which breaks the Cold War mould, does not allow for democratic control of political decisions. A complex political system can gain legitimacy from an educated and articulate public. This factor applies in Europe and, to a lesser extent, in North America, but has limited applicability elsewhere. Yet, as has so often been pointed out, the life of every Guatemalan coffee farmer is as dependent on world events as this is that of a transnational capitalist (Adams, 68). The liberal democratic ideology holds, and reports from developing countries

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tell us, that people are gaining the knowledge which will allow them to have some control over their lives. Such control will be meaningless unless political decisions extend beyond national boundaries. In that sense, Europe, which has given the world all of its major political ideologies, may once again be leading the way. Only a system of multiple identities seems capable of governing the technology of the near future. Edelgard Mahant

Glendon College, York University, Canada

NOTES 1. A recently fashionable technique among political scientists is called 'regime analysis.' It is based on the idea of functionally distinct, inter- or transnational networks which deal with issues, such as for example, agriculture or human fights. A regime includes national, trans- and international actors. It differs from the multi-layered system envisaged here in that regimes are meant to include nation-states; regime analysis foresees the persistence of the nation-state system (Krasner). 2. From the 1930s to the 1960s, David Mitrany developed an international relations theory called functionalism (not to be confused with its sociological equivalent). Mitrany foresaw a future in which sovereign governments would be replaced by networks of functional committees. The difference between Mitrany's system of functional committees and the system described here is that Mitrany believed in technological selfdetermination: technology itself would force the hands of experts who would work together to f'md the technically best solution to every problem. This idea, that technology has its own logic, is amazingly persistent and seems to recur under different names every few years (Skolnikoff). 'Epistemic communities' (P. Haas, 1992) is one of its most recent incarnations. 3. I have here limited myself to positive evaluations of the contributions of the Community's foreign policy to a sense of European identity. Complaints of the type: Europe really ought to do more and act in a united fashion and have been the stock in trade of journalists, academics and politicians since 1945 and are therefore, hardly worth repeating or analyzing. 4. All public opinion data is taken from the Eurobarometer surveys.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y AND REFERENCES Amalric, Jacques. 1991 . 'M. Balladur, Maastficht et les conservateurs britanniques.' Le Monde. Dec. 15-16. Ammon, Peter. 1992. 'International Politics and the Technological Revolution at a Turning Point.' Aussenpolitik 2:115-121. Birch, Anthony H. 1989. Nationalism and National Integration. London: Unwin Hyman. Breton, Raymond. 1992. Identity, Loyalty and Citizenship: Some General Issues. Paper presented to the University of Toronto, Centre for International Studies Conference on 'Federalism and the Nation-State,' June 4--6. Brittan, Sir Leon. 1991. 'Europe: Foreign Policy and Security.' Europe (Washington) Jan.Feb.: 15-17. Buzan, Barry. 1991. People, States and Fear. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

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