Investigating accountability of public police in the private employment realm

Investigating accountability of public police in the private employment realm

International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 57 (2019) 36–46 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect International Journal of Law, Crime and Ju...

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International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 57 (2019) 36–46

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijlcj

Investigating accountability of public police in the private employment realm

T

Mathew Zaiaa, Bruno Ujevicb, Randy K. Lippertb, Kevin Walbyc,∗ a b c

University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, Fauteux Hall, 57 Louis-Pasteur Private, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5, Canada University of Windsor, Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminology, 401 Sunset Avenue, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4, Canada University of Winnipeg, Department of Criminal Justice, Centennial Hall, 3rd Floor, 515 Portage Avenue, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3B 2E9, Canada

ARTICLE INFO

ABSTRACT

Keywords: Public police Paid detail Accountability State Market Oversight Regulation

Paid detail police work has grown in recent years across municipal/local and state/provincial jurisdictions in the United States and Canada, but not without controversy. Using Stenning's (2000) accountability framework for private and public police, we consider how and the extent to which the private employment of public police is regulated and rendered accountable. To accomplish this, we draw on interviews with 63 employers of paid detail as well as police officers, policies collected through freedom of information requests from 30 North American police departments about paid detail procedures as well as logs, and media coverage of paid detail issues. We found incredible variation in how paid detail is regulated, as well as many instances where accountability and oversight are lacking. After examining the consequences of ineffective or absent accountability mechanisms, we suggest a more uniform approach to paid detail standards. We conclude by discussing future research about paid detail regulation and policy.

1. Introduction Recent criminal cases raise questions of accountability of private employment of public police (hereinafter “paid detail”) who receive financial compensation for security-related work beyond their regular salaries. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is currently investigating Seattle Police Department's paid detail arrangements. Police officers and affiliated third-party companies used “strong-arm tactics” toward individuals and organizations and “overcharge[d] for hours worked” without oversight (Lewis, 2017a). Members of the public have claimed not only that private organizations were “pressured” to employ public police officers, but also that “people [have been] scared to talk about” related issues (Lewis, 2017a). In an Executive Order, Seattle's mayor listed these paid detail issues as featuring the “potential for mismanagement, conflicts of interest, [and] inequities between officers competing for secondary employment”1 (City of Seattle Office of the Mayor Executive Order, 2017). Jersey City's police officers have been under scrutiny over paid detail as well. One former police coordinator, as ‘middleman’, arranged for private companies to contact him rather than the City for paid detail services (McDonald, 2017a) and to directly receive their payments. Another officer raked in thousands of dollars for security shifts he failed to attend, causing the former Jersey City police chief to call for oversight of paid detail (McDonald, 2018b). Similar issues were reported as early as 2001 about officers paid for security work never performed at private retail store in Baltimore (Wilber and Craig, 2001). New Orleans has likewise experienced Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (M. Zaia), [email protected] (K. Walby). 1 Paid detail and secondary employment differ in that the latter is broader and may or may not include security-related work (see Lippert et al., forthcoming). ∗

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcj.2019.01.006 Received 9 August 2018; Received in revised form 2 December 2018; Accepted 29 January 2019 Available online 07 March 2019 1756-0616/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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criminal cases and controversy regarding paid detail arrangements and changes in policy (O’Hara and Sainato, 2015; US DOJ Civil Rights Division, 2011). In this paper, we examine how private employment of public police is regulated and rendered accountable. We understand accountability following Goldsmith (2010: 920) as “processes whereby police are made to explain their actions.” We use freedom of information (FOI) data from police departments, interviews with police and employers, and local news reports to investigate how and how much paid detail is held accountable by stakeholders and governing bodies to contribute to growing paid detail literature. We use Stenning's (2000: 338) “principal mechanisms” of accountability framework to do so. Stenning created this framework to assess the work of private security personnel. However, paid detail presents a case in which privately employed officers are public police. We focus on paid detail because it is the quintessential example of policing that straddles the public-private dichotomy. Attention to this peculiar hybrid form matters in an age of increasing exchange between private and public policing realms (Button and Wakefield, 2018; White, 2012). Though we detect several of Stenning's accountability mechanisms operating in paid detail arrangements, some are more significant than others and others simply do not apply, suggesting a need for minor refinement of his typology in its application to paid detail. First, we describe literature on paid detail policing. Second, we discuss Stenning’s (2000) typology used to measure the extent of paid detail's accountability. We then outline our research procedures and data sources. Next, we consider the different mechanisms of accountability and their limits. We conclude by discussing the relative significance and need for minor refinement of Stenning's typology as well as pointing to future research directions. We also discuss what we deem are the most effective arrangements (or ‘best practices’) of paid detail oversight for four main stakeholders: police departments, officers, employers, and taxpayers. 2. Paid detail oversight: definitions and previous research We use the most common term ‘paid detail’ – also called ‘paid duty’, off-duty’, special duty’, ‘user pays’ policing (Lippert and Walby, 2014) – to refer to public police officers providing security-related work to individuals and organizations. This paid detail includes officers performing security duties at festivals, sporting events, retail stores, and occasionally bars and clubs (Ayling and Shearing, 2008). Almost all larger police departments in North America have paid detail, allowing officers to increase their earnings. Users of paid detail direct their payment either to a third-party agency supplying paid detail services, city government, or police department, all of whom then distribute most of these monies to officers (Stoughton, 2017). Regulation and accountability of public police are becoming more complex as they become more integrated with private agents (Mulone, 2011). Given the pervasiveness of paid detail, addressing these regulatory issues becomes paramount. Since Reiss's (1998) probe of paid detail in the US, research has sought to explicate the implications surrounding this type of policing (Button, 2013). Johnston (1992) denotes how the shift from the public as a client, to the public as a consumer within paid detail muddles police accountability, and leaves police more prone to accusations of corruption, and contributes to a ‘two-tiered’ system of policing – whereby services are allocated according to wealth of clients, rather than threat of crime (1992: 65–71; Loader, 1999: 382–3). Ayling and Shearing (2008) outline how accountability becomes magnified under paid detail. They question who holds officers accountable during paid detail shifts, what legal rights and liabilities pertain to paid detail, and the extent to which new inefficiencies and inequalities will develop during service distribution (2008: 42; Ayling et al., 2009). In their study of paid detail in the New Orleans Police Department, O’Hara and Saintano (2015) reveal how inadequately regulated paid detail can contribute to widespread corruption and abuse affecting multiple levels and ranks of police. There remains a scholarly void regarding how paid detail is (and should be) regulated and made accountable. In their study of security work across England and Wales, Crawford and Lister (2006) suggest the commercialized nature of providing security coupled with the police's role as market competitors and regulators put the police in an ambiguous position. They recommend establishment of an independent regulatory agency that ensures fair competition while safeguarding public interest and development of policing boards to extend oversight mechanisms to encompass community safety (2006: 182–3). Sarre and Prenzler (2000) likewise draw attention to the challenges of regulating paid detail and the potential for corruption to emerge if it is not. While these suggestions address regulatory issues concerning market competition and residential safety, paid detail extends beyond providing residential-based security. Exploration of paid detail in Canada (Lippert and Walby, 2014, 2013), the UK (Gans, 2000), and the US (Sharp, 1999; Brunet, 2008; Jenks, 2009; Lyle, 2015; Stoughton, 2017) provides groundwork for understanding how paid detail is situated within policing. Investigation into how practices vary across state jurisdictions as well as a much fuller range of mechanisms like those Stenning proffers is required. This paper addresses these gaps in policing literature regarding paid detail oversight and mechanisms of accountability. 3. Theoretical framework Paid detail encompasses ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres of policing. Officers make use of resources afforded to them as public police, while providing security for private interests. This raises the question of how paid detail is regulated. We adopt Stenning's (2000) framework on the regulation and accountability of private police. Contributing to literature on police accountability (McDaniel, 2018; Rogers, 2013; Rogers and Gravelle, 2012; Porter and Prenzler, 2012; Gravelle and Rogers, 2011; Stenning, 2009) and international variation in police accountability (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2014; Newburn, 2012), we consider Stenning's framework and its applicability to paid detail across North American police departments. Stenning's (2000) accountability and oversight mechanisms of the private-public policing domains differ. Accountability of public police may theoretically exist, but its efficacy can be exaggerated (2000: 337) and limited in practice. Police accountability varies not only by national context but by public and private stakeholders among which police are situated in local and regional networks. Below we discuss Stenning's typology. 37

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The first mechanism of accountability is ‘state regulation’ (Stenning, 2000: 336). This manifests in formal guidelines enforced by the state that usually pertain to aspects like licensing, training requirements, or background checks (see also Prenzler and Sarre, 1999; Sarre and Prenzler, 1999). Stenning (2000) notes that while most jurisdictions regulate private police at the state level, the level of accountability derived differs from its public police counterpart substantially due to the high variability in its jurisdictional enforcement (O’Connor et al., 2008). The second mechanism, ‘industry self-regulation’, is voluntary in nature, which can be problematic since larger agencies participate in this form of regulation, often for self-interest (Stenning, 2000: 341). The third and fourth mechanisms are ‘criminal’ and ‘civil’ liability, respectively. Though these may not always represent substantial sources of accountability for public police (due to elevated status as government agents), private police typically do not have access to similar protections, resulting in public authorities having greater propensity to find private police legally liable (2000: 341–2). Stenning calls the fifth mechanism ‘contractual liability’. Due to the contractual nature of private police services, this form of liability signifies ways through which private police can be held liable by standards set either by the contract security firms (or in the case of paid detail, police departments) themselves or in consultation with clients (2000: 344). The sixth mechanism, ‘labour and employment law’, usually refers to aspects such as grievance processing or union certification and provides avenues whereby substandard policing activities are held accountable (2000: 343). Finally, Stenning refers to ‘accountability through the market’, whereby private police can be held accountable to their consumers (2000: 345); in other words, consumers may choose to seek superior services from other private companies in the marketplace. 4. Methods and procedures We drew on a large study exploring paid detail in North American police departments to consider Stenning's ‘tool-box’. We collected data from several sources, including regulations, qualitative interviews and news media reports. First, paid detail policies from 30 police departments in the US and Canada were examined. These departmental policies were gathered via FOI requests made to North American police departments. The responses we received from police departments included policies fully disclosed, partially disclosed, completely undisclosed, or simply nonexistent. Most department responses were received from Canadian rather than US departments. Given the variation in the number of departments in each country, we selected sites with a surrounding population size of at least 100,000. This sample was drawn from the list of received departmental policies. Next, we examined online news articles about paid detail from 2004 onward. These were explored for controversies and issues that emerged due to lack of oversight. These were not from any one newspaper; instead, we gathered pertinent online news articles to explore paid detail issues. Finally, we analyzed 63 interviews with paid detail employers as well as several with police. Interviewees were in cities with a population of greater than 100,000. Using thematic analysis (Ryan and Bernard, 2003) we located dominant discourses consistent with Stenning's ‘tool-box’ throughout interview transcriptions regarding paid detail user experiences. In addition, we used paid detail logs accessed using FOI requests. Some logs included names of employers, allowing us to contact the organizations and, in some cases, interview their representatives about paid detail. 5. Findings: accountability mechanisms for paid detail arrangements To aid our analysis (and due to space limitations) we group Stenning's seven categories of similar ilk into three broader categories, namely, ‘state regulation’, ‘private regulation’, and ‘market regulation’. We use ‘state regulation’ to encompass his ‘criminal liability’, ‘state regulation’ and ‘labour and employment law’ categories; ‘private regulation’ to encompass civil liability and contractual liability2; and ‘market regulation’ to encompass accountability through the market and industry self-regulation. Below we analyze the FOI data, local news reports about paid detail issues, and user accounts from qualitative interviews. We use Stenning's classification to measure the nature and extent of paid detail accountability, showing that most of Stenning's mechanisms are significant when measuring the accountability of paid detail, while others are less extant. 5.1. State regulation Accountability can be sometimes achieved through external, state-led regulation. We understand this as referring to both formal legislation and government-led investigations into police (mis)conduct. We examined these external sources of regulation across North America. In Canada, each province legislates and governs police officers by detailing minimal standards, duties, and responsibilities for officers, chiefs, boards, and commissions (Stenning, 1982). While the structure and content of these acts are similar, there are large discrepancies in how these laws govern paid detail. Of six provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Saskatchewan) examined, only Nova Scotia's Police Act contains a designated subsection outlining regulations and standards for paid detail. The subsection mandates written departmental policies to ensure paid detail requests are made to the chief officer; it also sets restrictions on permitted and prohibited types of paid detail employment (Police Act, S.N.S., 2004, c. 31, s. 56). Ontario legislation mentions paid detail, but only when listing exceptions to restricted employment activities and when outlining that the form of employment is to be arranged through the police service (Police Services Act, R.S.O., 1999, c. 15, s. 49 (2)). British Columbia's Police Act only contains a reference to the phrase “off duty but in uniform”, outlining forms of misconduct that also apply to “on duty” officers (Police Act, R.S.B.C., 1996, c. 11, s. 77). Other provincial legislation (Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan) fails to mention paid detail. 2

While the courts determine and enforce the area, it is important to note that contracts can be privately regulated and assumed. 38

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In each of the six US states (California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Texas, Washington) examined there is minor legislative paid detail reference. The issues covered therein, however, illustrate the wide variation in paid detail regulation. Washington's legislation outlines officers may engage in paid detail employment for private benefit, subject to chief-approved guidelines (Revised Code of Washington, 2005, s. 43, s. 112). Massachusetts restricts paid detail if the job's responsibilities conflict with a police officer's job (Massachusetts General Laws, 2013, c. 268A, s. 23). Concerning Florida, conflicts of interest are taken further, as state legislation prohibits being employed by or engaging with alcohol-selling establishments while working paid detail (Florida Statute, 2017, c. 561, s. 25). California's state provisions pertain to user requests being subject to approval by a board of supervisors, but they also include more detailed provisions not found in other state legislation (i.e. officers cannot exercise regular police powers while providing security services through paid detail during a strike) (California Penal Code, 2004, c. 70). Texas state legislation also mentions paid detail, outlining that police departments shall adopt “reasonable” and “uniformly applied” guidelines pertaining to acceptable paid detail employment (Texas Government Code, 2003, c. 411, s. 77). Police can also be subject to criminal law regarding paid detail. Police accountability derived from the criminal law relies on the state's willingness (or reluctance) to prosecute acts of criminal wrongdoing (Stenning, 2000). To determine the extent to which criminal law represents a source of accountability for paid detail, we analyzed online news media covering paid detail practices. Reported issues and allegations were discovered across many departments examined in the current study; however, reports of criminal law violations were limited to fewer departments, mostly in the US. Two significant and recent reports pertain to Seattle and Jersey City. In both, allegations surrounding corruptive paid detail practices resulted in FBI-led investigations. 5.1.1. Seattle media accounts Leading up to the FBI-led investigation of Seattle Police Department's (SPD) paid detail, two companies, both of which were external to SPD, had been coordinating most of the department's paid detail assignments. The first of these companies, Seattle's Finest, was created in 2002 by a now-retired police officer (Carter and Miletich, 2017), while the second company, Seattle Security, was an extension of Seattle's police union. As a result, former officers and union leaders oversaw SPD's paid detail prior to the 2017 investigation (Carter and Miletich, 2017). The focus of the investigation involved claims of officer strong-arm tactics as well as paid detail price-fixing. This intensified when details of a conversation – occurring between a seasoned SPD officer and the CEO of an online-based service that had been approved to coordinate Seattle's paid detail – were disclosed to the FBI. During this conversation, the SPD officer allegedly described the lucrative and corrupt paid detail arrangements. According to the memo provided to the FBI, the officer repeatedly referred to the two Seattle-based, third-party companies as “the mafia” before describing the ease and effectiveness through which officers were able to price-gouge (Carter and Miletich, 2017). If officers wanted a pay raise from parking garage companies, he explained, they would threaten to ensure no officers would be assigned to work there until granted a raise (Lewis, 2017b). Details also included the SPD officer outlining how certain traffic assignments were known around the department as “cake jobs” because officers would typically be required for 30 min, while being paid for four hours. The officer explained these jobs were protected and would proceed without interference because they knew employers would “end up with broken knee caps” (Miletich and Carter, 2017a). 5.1.2. Jersey city media accounts In similar events, an FBI-led investigation placed Jersey City Police Department's (JCPD) paid detail program in its purview in 2017. Prior to the investigation, JCPD paid detail operated through a voucher system to keep track of hours and paid detail assignments. Under this system, the officer, the organization hiring the officer, and the job coordinator were each required to complete a portion of the voucher before submitting to the city for approval and payment (McDonald, 2017b; Mota, 2017). While this process is not dissimilar to that of other US departments, the federal probe revealed how the program's lack of oversight paved the way for a lucrative criminal scheme that permeated multiple ranks within the department. In one instance, a JCPD officer had given a departmental colleague USD $11,825 in bribes in exchange for phony assignment vouchers for which he was then compensated (Malinconico, 2017). Another case of wrongdoing involved a paid detail coordinator who, rather than submitting assignments to the city, dealt with paid detail users directly, offering discounts. For over five years, this coordinator was able to operate his scheme, which netted him over $230,000 from users, with neither the JCPD nor the municipality collecting its required fees (McDonald, 2017a). Federal prosecutors also revealed that in four years leading up to his appointment, the Chief of JCPD accepted $31,700 from a federally funded public housing association for paid detail for which he was not present (McDonald, 2018a). After numerous arrests, suspensions, and indictments that came as a result of the federal investigation into JCPD's paid detail program, 11 officers of varied ranks and seniority admitted their involvement in the lucrative scheme, with more expected as the investigation nears its end (McDonald, 2018d). Among these officers, four have already been sentenced: two received probation and house arrest, while the other two received 18-month federal prison sentences (Villanova, 2018). In addition to sentencing, the officers were ordered to pay restitution and forfeiture amounts of $113,145 and $39,587 (McDonald, 2018c). When comparing the federal inquiry into the misconduct-ridden paid detail programs of JCPD and SPD, the variation in regulation, and by extension, accountability is apparent. While fraudulent and corruptive practices were found to have flooded both departments,3 it was only in the JCPD investigation that those responsible for these practices were prosecuted and found criminally liable. These instances of abuse of process and corruption bring into question the view that police are purveyors of a moral order (Terpstra, 2011). It is evident that state regulation can be a source of accountability for paid detail, but the variability with which it is 3 Not all of the above-mentioned issues were a product strictly of paid detail. However, we show these to suggest that substandard paid detail structures and practices arguably heightened the issues.

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Table 1 Hourly officer paid detail and regular shifts.a Police Service

Paid Detail Constable Rate (Per Hour)

First Class Constable (FCC) Rate (Per Hour)

How Paid Detail Rate is Determined in Policy

Barrie, ON Calgary, AB Cape Breton, NS Chatham, ON Durham, ON Edmonton, AB Guelph, ON Halifax, NS Halton, ON Hamilton, ON London, ON Niagara, ON Ottawa, ON Peel, ON Regina, SK Saanich, BC Sudbury, ON Vancouver, BC Winnipeg, MB York, ON

$71.40 – $42.00 $70.00 $71.00 $126.00 $71.00/81.00b $64.00 $70.71 $69.60 $70.01 $74.25 $69.75 $77.00 $112.18 $91.40 $69.51 $127.01 $110.25 $71.00

$45.70 $50.00 – $46.67 $43.30 $47.38 $45.60 – 47.14c $44.19 $44.64 47.30c $46.50 47.33c $48.05 $45.70 $44.16 $48.19 $46.56 $46.33

1.5 X Base Constable Rate Not Indicated Not Indicated 1.5 X FCC Rate 1.6 X FCC Rate Not Indicated 1.5 X FCC Rate Not Indicated Overtime of FCC Rate 1.5 X FCC Rate Not Indicated Not Indicated Not Indicated 1.6 X FCC Rate Not Indicated 2 X FCC Rate Not Indicated Not Indicated Not Indicated Determined by Police Service Board

a While it might be assumed that paid detail rates would fluctuate across different departments within Canada due to different resources and personnel allocation, the rates shown here exclude additional administrative fees that all police departments also charge. The separation between the lowest and highest hourly wages earned by on-duty first-class constables (FCC) is $6.70, which is dwarfed by the $85 swing in paid detail wages earned by officers across these same departments. Most commonly, paid detail rates equate to being 1.5 times the hourly FCC rate, which can generally be in the high-60 to low-70-dollar range. Paid detail officers within four Western Canadian departments (Edmonton, Regina, Vancouver, Winnipeg) earn an excess $100 per hour, which doubles their respective on-duty rates. b Different rates for non-alcoholic/alcoholic events. c Rates located from outside source, not departmental policy.

enforced across jurisdictions raises doubts about its effectiveness. 5.2. Private regulation In this section, we use paid detail policies collected through FOI requests made to several police departments. The disclosed policies contained information indicative of each department regulating their own paid detail procedures and policies, generally according to the given Chief. Though police departments are, by nature, ‘public’ bodies, below we show their private facets. Here, there is a sense in which police departments are acting as private contract security firms rather than publicly regulating themselves. Below we identify how these aspects of paid detail are partially regulated by Stenning's ‘tool box’, yet such regulation's variation through policies shows that paid detail is not held to a uniform degree of accountability by private regulation. 5.2.1. Subjecting users to departmental standards through policy Most paid detail policies stipulate officer pay rates, number and types of officers required for an event, and the number of hours to be worked. With department heads and police service boards often having exclusive power over these standards, the extent to which these minimums vary can affect users requesting paid detail, especially those requiring paid detail from more than one police service. Most police services require a minimum number of paid detail hours for which users must pay. A minimum number is usually set without room for negotiation. Most policies contain a three-hour minimum even if users required less. Other departments noted a four-hour minimum or even neglected to provide a minimum requirement. This is a key distinction, no less for users who have trouble affording payments for paid detail; one hour significantly increases costs, especially if a higher number of officers is required. This is further emphasized in a section below on users’ experiences of paid detail. Table 1 indicates the hourly rate constables earn for paid detail within selected Canadian police departments.4 Beyond officer rates (and sometimes additional vehicle rates),5 policies also commonly stipulated a minimum number of officers for paid detail as well as the number of (staff) sergeants required, which are paid at a much higher rate. These minimums significantly differ from one department to the next. Within Ontario (Canada), for example, one department requires that every five officers have a sergeant assigned (Barrie Police Service Procedure #24, 2015), and that 15 officers have two sergeants and one staff sergeant. 4 The rates shown in this table are only displayed for sites where costs were found in departmental paid detail policies or on a department's webpage and/or formal paid detail applications for users' access (publicly available on websites) containing paid detail costs therein. 5 The sub-section below on user experiences contains excerpts regarding users' sentiments toward such vehicle (e.g. car, motorcycle, etc.) rates.

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However, another Ontario police service requires only one sergeant for up to and including 12 required officers (Durham Regional Police Directive, 2015). Yet another Ontario police service requires one sergeant where four to seven officers are required6 (Halton Regional Police Directive, 2015) and one sergeant for 15 officers in another department (Peel Regional Police Directive, 2015). US departments are similarly disparate. For every three to 15 officers required for a paid detail, the Austin Police Department requires one supervisor to be present at the detail (Austin Police Department Secondary Employment, Policy 949, 2015). In contrast, another US police department necessitates a second supervisor when “the number of employed police officers exceed[s] six” (Detroit Police Department Secondary Employment, 2016). Other departments do not comment on these minimums and requirements, perhaps to grant authority to a higher-ranked officer to decide whether sergeants and other superiors are needed. A final point on minima involves the allocation of the number of police officers as per departmental guidelines. Here, some policies contain a required number of officers for certain crowd sizes expected to be at a given event. Many departments expect users to, upon requesting paid detail, provide an estimation of how many persons are supposed to occupy the event for which they require paid detail services. One Canadian police service lays out its minimum number of officers needed per event population size: two police members for 250 people, three for 251 people, and five (and one sergeant) for more than 500 people (Winnipeg Special Duty, 2015). Another department stipulates there be two officers for up to 499 people; three for 500 to 999 people; four for 1000 to 1999 people; six for 2000 to 4999 people; and three additional officers per every 1000 following 5000 people (Niagara Regional Police Service General Order 137.03). The extent to which such sporadic formulae were used, however, was minimal. Instead, many departmental policies outline “crowd size” as a staffing consideration without detailing further metrics or completely neglect to mention anything related. As seemingly trivial and inconsequential as these variations in department-mandated procedures may appear to be, when quantified their importance becomes clear. In considering these differences in pay rates and how officers are allocated in the departments cited above, if users in each city were to request paid detail for an event with 501 people for five hours, it would cost approximately $3400 in Winnipeg and $1100 (CAD) in Niagara for officer wages alone. 5.2.2. Accountability through officer and departmental procedures In addition to policy provisions regarding user-related issues, such as hiring more officers, paid detail policies address how accountability could be achieved through police officer and departmental procedures.7 First, many departments engage with the process of officer assignment distribution differently from each other. Some departments use automated systems that, upon receiving a request for paid detail, release notifications to police officers listing the given assignment. These systems, such as Durham's (Canada) as well as Halton's (Canada) Paid Duty Management Systems, New York's (US) Paid Detail Intranet Assignment System, or Peel's (Canada) Central Paid Duty System, take many factors into consideration when algorithmically selecting officers for paid details. These include officers acquiring paid details on a first-come basis, officers' previous number of on- and off-duty hours, and officer rank, such that the systems “satisfy an equal sharing of paid [details] among those that apply” (Ottawa Paid Duty Assignments, 2017). Whereas some departments refer to these systems in their paid detail policies, other departments look to their Extra Work Clerk, Platoon Commander, or Division Sergeant to select officers impartially. These criteria can be – sometimes similarly to the above-mentioned paid detail systems – “based on the amount of special events and temporary [paid detail] job hours assigned to the individual for the past year” with potential discipline for failing to attend one's assigned paid detail: “Officers who fail to show for any reason … will be assessed double the hours initially given,” in turn affecting their future paid detail prospects (Miami Specialized Operations, Departmental Order 12). It is important to address how officers are selected for paid detail given the disparities shown within departments regarding the number of hours worked by officers. Some officers double their take-home pay through paid detail, whereas others may not experience the extent of these lucrative opportunities. One Southern Canadian police department's paid detail policy indicates that officers cannot work more than a 12-h paid detail shift. Nevertheless, the same department's paid detail logs for the same year show 41 cases where individual officers transgressed this limitation, working between 13 and 16 h for a single paid detail assignment. Here, we see the importance of equal distribution of assignments due to some officers receiving too many hours over others despite identical qualifications. Second, paid detail policies typically outline a list of factors affecting whether user requests are accepted or rejected. These factors include crowd size; whether alcohol is served; type, nature and location of events; and number of paid detail hours being requested by users. Policies within US departments leaned more toward specifying types of prohibited and restricted employment in which officers could not work (Lippert et al., forthcoming). Factors determining whether a paid detail is approved or how many officers are required for an assignment generally went unmentioned. As such, many paid detail policies contained a list of prohibited employment. These included, but were not limited to, working as a bill collector; for a wrecker company; as a bouncer; as security at a sexually-oriented business (Austin Secondary Employment 949, 2015); with assignments reflecting adversely on the professionalism of the department (Detroit Secondary Employment Directive, 2016); or when employment is in either a medical cannabis cultivation center or a medical cannabis distribution center (Chicago Secondary Employment, 2015). While many departments do not allow paid detail at establishments where liquor is being served, some permit such employment with caveats: a minimum of two officers is required, officers cannot be bouncers, and officers cannot leave each other for transporting prisoners (Jacksonville Office of the Sheriff General Order, 2014). SPD's paid detail policy also expresses that employment involving any form of gambling (i.e. cards, bingo, raffles) is prohibited in addition to professional sports events where there is a substantial risk of serious injury (Seattle Secondary Employment, 2014). Canadian departments also list prohibited types of paid details. These similarly include assignments where conflicts of interest 6

A sergeant here is included in the “four to seven” officers requested. Here, state and/or provincial employment and labour laws are rarely explicitly mentioned, though these policies presumably adhere to such legislation. 7

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exist (Calgary Police Service, 2012); where a member is required to be inside a premise where liquor is being served with no arrangements for secondary security (Chatham-Kent Police Service Procedures, 2011); where officers are needed as bouncers or doormen (Halifax Departmental Order #59-99); and that involve money escorts (Ottawa Paid Duty Assignments, 3.16, 2017). Also noteworthy are those assignments prohibited in only one or two departments such as those creating an unfair distribution of services (e.g. public or private schools) (Calgary Police Service, 2012). Many departmental paid detail policies neglected to include these prohibitions. Many of these policies did, however, note that the final decision regarding paid detail acceptance rests with the Chief. Finally, some departmental paid detail policies include training requirements for all officers applying to and seeking paid detail assignments. London's (Canada) paid detail policy indicates that “all eligible [police] members shall complete a [Paid Detail] Training Session prior to participating in [Paid Details] and attend subsequent training sessions when directed” (London Police Procedures, Part II). Here, the police department acknowledges that possible changes to and different types of paid details may require further departmental training before assigning paid details. Other departments, such as Ottawa's, direct officers to training for types of assignments such as traffic escort duties (Ottawa Paid Duty Assignments, 2017). However, many departmental paid detail policies do not contain any sort of ongoing training requirement. Not only does this mean that officers could be assigned to jobs without training for assignments, but also that some departments that require training could be giving their users trained officers for the respective assignment rather than any officer going to work a paid detail. The variation stems not from ‘state’ regulation per se, but instead from a form of private regulation overseen by a public police department. The fact that these policies exist in all departments studied shows that private regulation is in principle acting as a source of accountability for paid detail. By stating what types of assignments are accepted for paid detail – as some department policies do – a standard of conduct for officers can be recognized. However, the variation in the parameters covered by these policies highlights the problem that is present within this mode of accountability. When some departments fail to restrict aspects of paid detail procedures and lack a stringent and transparent standard of conduct that exists in other departments, uniform accountability for substandard policing can be more difficult to establish. 5.3. Market regulation: user experiences of paid detail This section focuses on user experiences of paid detail that highlight the influence of market regulation. We show that some consumers are forced by the local government or police department to use paid detail for their events despite how they may feel about paid detail. While it might be thought that insurance companies require the users whom they insure to hire paid detail for events or in particular business enterprises, we found this was rare; rather, insurance companies tend to require only some kind of private security detail, which does not necessarily have to include paid detail officers. We find some users complain about the quality of service they receive after being forced into using paid detail. Industry self-regulation is also found through individual police departments within the paid detail ‘industry’ maintaining their own standards of regulation. We begin with the number of officers required for each paid detail assignment. Though some departments detail their processes of officer assignment per crowd size, type of paid detail, etc., others do not disclose factors used to calculate measures of risk. Within a Canadian city, we found users either ambiguously knowing such calculations or being completely unaware of how these processes unfold. One user remarks: [T]hey have a matrix that they use to determining two things: one, minimum number of officers and two, like an initial number of officers. And it's based on […] is it inside or outside? Is there alcohol? […] Is it by the water or not? Like there's […] probably 10 or 12, and I haven't seen this matrix. It's something that they ask for and they don't share with you (Southern Canada User 03). This user then admits to not becoming aware of a matrix calculator through any formal document, but instead by “just talking to the guys over the last number of years” (Southern Canada User 03). Others were completely unaware of how these processes unfold: Interviewer: [A]re there any municipal or provincial rules requiring a certain number of officers? User: I want to say no. […] It can be frustrating as an organizer because […] they'll introduce rules and regulations you didn't anticipate. [T]hey recommend that we have officers, and just based on the cost we're like “no”. And then … they wanted to have 4 officers … and yeah it was one of these conversations that was like 4 officers for, again, an event that's always been incident free, like what is that based on? And they didn't have an answer. It was like their discretion. […] So in the time of our events early on … the person in charge of police had changed, and the first guy who demanded us having 4 was kind of a bulldog and kind of a bully, and … he put that on us (Southern Canada User 06). Here, the user implies a lack of strict policy outlining the number of officers distributed per paid detail assignment. The user appears to be at a loss when considering the processes of paid details and is unable to negotiate the number of officers. The same user responds to the interviewer asking how the number of officers is particularly determined: So that's assigned by the city for us. […] So we couldn't be allowed to have two officers; there has to be a sergeant on always. I don't think two officers are allowed to go without a sergeant from my understanding. So … one of them has to be a sergeant … which you pay more for (Southern Canada User 06). Another user within the same jurisdiction echoes the sentiment: “My understanding is they have to come in groups of two, not assigned one officer to a duty. They always come in a group of two” (Southern Canada User 07). However, one user within the same jurisdiction using provincial officers had a different experience, indicating that “it is pretty well up to us how many we feel we need 42

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and we have never had to negotiate anything” (OPP User 02), whereas another user notes “of course you don't get one you always get two [officers]” (OPP User 01). Across the border, some users in the US can use their employees to compensate for officers, a practice generally unsupported in other North American jurisdictions: “We started with two before but then we reduced it to just one because we added our own employees instead” (Western US User 03, emphasis added). In contrast, other US users do not have such an opportunity but rather adhere completely to the department's assignment determination: “[W]e will review that number and if anything we would up it if we felt we needed extra” (Northeastern US User 01). Users also recurrently mention the heavy cost of hiring paid detail. They remark upon not only the cost of paying for individual officers, but also the administrative fees coupled with officer rates: “[S]omebody else steps in to say well these are the fees, but right now you're kind of at the [ir] mercy. […] If the fees go up 20% next year then you're going to be paying 20% more, there's nothing you can do” (Western Canada User 02). Some users struggle to afford paid detail to the extent of cancelling their event. One user speaks to such barriers: [Y]ou know, it's just this circular chicken and egg thing you can't really get away from … so like essentially if you have the money you can buy the services and then you have your event, and if you don't have the money and you can't negotiate the services because there's no movement then you end up like we did closing your festival down (Western Canada User 04). One of the most emphatically presented concerns for some users was the requirement to pay for police vehicles. One user describes their rationale behind such resentment: [A] lot of us have debates around the incremental cost, like police cars. […] [W]e pay for the vehicle, […] but typically see a $1,500 charge for a car on our race weekends. […] Some police staff guys were telling them too it doesn't make any sense that we're paying that much because the car's already paid for by tax payers, they're not incremental cars. And frankly most of them are more than four years old, and at least I've been told by the city … that they write their cars off in four years. […] And that's not really fair to us … and my other argument is … if I assume the police cruiser costs $48,000 … through the years that's basically a thousand dollars a month in costs. […] And I know there's wear and tear and oil changes, but frankly the cars that come out to our events, they drive maybe 10 [kilometers] at the most (Southern Canada User 05). Though the above-mentioned user is forced to pay for police vehicles, other users have been able to negotiate with police, ultimately removing vehicle requirements (Southern Canada User 10). Another issue arises when and whether officers volunteer for paid detail without financial compensation. This matter was key to examine given that many users are never able to obtain volunteer officers to work ‘paid’ details given its prohibition in some departments. One user remarks: “[A]t times, we've been able to get enough officers to volunteer […] so if we can get enough volunteers then we don't have to go to paid [detail]” (Southern Canada User 10). Another user pays municipal police while having provincial police officers volunteering: “[A]ll Ontario Provincial Police […] that we have ever had, have been strictly voluntary” (Southern Canada User 12). Many departments can compensate for fewer officers by using volunteers. However, some US departments do not allow officers to volunteer. Instead, they must be hired. Many Canadian users similarly express the inability to have volunteer officers. Users also complained about the quality of service offered with paid detail, though this was by no means a predominant sentiment among all users. One user describes the stress that paid detail adds when not knowing if the event can commence until the paid detail situation is finalized. This user hires paid detail from many cities given the nature of the event: I forget which city it was, but there's one where you don't even know until … the Monday morning if those positions have been filled [by officers]. […] That is always … an extra stress that I … wish I didn't have to worry about (Southern Canada User 22). Others explain that officers sometimes never show up for their assignment, forcing the user's plans to change: “Well when we have a construction project and our crew is out there and ready to go and the detail doesn't show up, we've actually shut down our project” (Northeastern US User 02). The user explains that this disadvantages the community “[b]ecause the people are counting on it getting worked on and it doesn't get done” (Northeastern US User 02). Paid detail users explain the issues they face when hiring officers for their events and other organizational purposes. Not only do they describe how they feel to be disadvantaged in paid detail relations, but users describe police departments using paid detail to “market or promote themselves in that regard” (Southern Canada User 12). Even though users are dissatisfied in many cases – some of which involve users freely choosing to use paid detail – many feel coerced to hire paid detail officers. To the extent that they are not coerced or required, such as in retail stores, employers could go elsewhere in the market to hire alternative private security agents. It is at that point that the complaints above are significant and that police would have to change arrangements to satisfy their ‘customers.’ 6. Discussion and conclusion Contributing to literature on police accountability (McDaniel, 2018; Terpstra and Fyfe, 2014; Rogers, 2013; Newburn, 2012; Porter and Prenzler, 2012), we have used Stenning's (2000) work to gauge how paid detail is held accountable. Although Stenning does not explicitly mention paid detail, as he focused on traditional private security, our findings show that his framework can be adopted to examine accountability of paid detail policing. Like Stenning's analysis of public and private police, the principles of accountability provide opportunities through which paid detail could be held accountable. However, often these standards are neither uniformly applied nor adequately enforced across jurisdictions. The varied presence of these standards is most evident when measuring the degree to which state regulation acts as a mechanism of accountability for paid detail across the departments examined. In Canada alone, three of the six provincial policing statutes 43

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examined were devoid of any mention of paid detail and how departments should regulate its practice, while two of the remaining three include a subsection dedicated to providing departments with a minimum set of requirements and restrictions regarding paid detail. The opportunity for state legislation to act as a source of accountability for all police departments is squandered when this legislation bears no regulatory guidance for paid detail practices within entire states or provinces. There is no valid rationale as to why each state and province's legislation should not implement a minimum baseline of standards that could hold paid detail to account – irrespective of departmental differences that certainly exist. Upon measuring the extent that accountability within paid detail is realized, it also becomes evident that market regulation is limited as a source of accountability. The issues and experiences reported by users of paid detail illustrate that, while there exists the possibility for some negotiable market decisions to be made by users, it is more likely that users are left feeling coerced into becoming consumers of non-negotiable private security services – which are supplied to them by police departments whose substandard product can be shielded by the monopoly it exerts over its jurisdiction. The deficiency in paid detail accountability derived from both the state and the market results in a system reliant on private regulation in the form of departments self-regulating within the paid detail ‘industry’. As Stenning (2000: 341) noted, self-regulation can represent an opportunity for accountability among some in the policing market, but its voluntary and self-serving character impedes it from becoming an effective source of accountability across larger domains of policing. The effects of this over-reliance on individual departments self-regulating, rather than being held accountable by the state or the market, becomes apparent in the degree to which the policies and procedures vary between each department. Whether in the number and type of officers required for a given event, or the hourly rates that users are charged for paid detail, there are outliers and unexplained differences in nearly all cases. The opaque, disparate reality of these paid detail procedures are a consequence of numerous police departments being afforded the opportunity to dictate their own terms of service through the self-regulation of paid detail, rather than having the state and/or market act as the source of accountability. Our analysis of paid detail reveals the notion of the private in Stenning's model could be refined further in light of this hybrid form of policing. Paid detail underscores that in the new age of exchange between public and private policing sectors, the public becomes private in determining how and to whom services are provided. Thus, there needs to be greater consideration of this private regulation by what many would otherwise assume is a state agency, the public police. In discovering principles of accountability through Stenning's tool-box – particularly the significance of industry self-regulation – stakeholders involved in paid detail relations, including officers, sometimes do not experience fair practices. We suggest specific ‘best practices’ include, but are not limited to, an algorithmic system to select officers for paid detail; a similar program to assess risk related to a paid detail application by users; an online payment system directed to a police department to avoid any individual corruption; and most importantly an oversight body to govern and regulate paid detail within provinces and states. One Southern Canadian user echoes this by suggesting paid detail should be “centralized and standardized.” Overall, strengthening some principles in Stenning's accountability framework and applying them to paid detail might help prevent or detect corrupt schemes considering the pressures and ethical conflicts that arise during a paid detail shift. Paid detail is the quintessential model of policing cutting across the public-private dichotomy. This research makes empirical contributions to policing literature not only by pointing out flaws in the long-standing practice of paid detail, but by also showing how this ‘private’ practice by ‘public’ police presents issues for understanding the practicalities of accountability in hybrid policing. We discerned industry self-regulation to be the most pervasive of Stenning’s (2000) principles for paid detail. 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