The joint Russian–Norwegian governance of the Barents Sea LME fisheries

The joint Russian–Norwegian governance of the Barents Sea LME fisheries

Author’s Accepted Manuscript The joint Russian-Norwegian governance of the Barents SEA LME Fisheries Lidvard Grønnevet www.elsevier.com/locate/envdev...

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Author’s Accepted Manuscript The joint Russian-Norwegian governance of the Barents SEA LME Fisheries Lidvard Grønnevet

www.elsevier.com/locate/envdev

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S2211-4645(15)00073-1 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envdev.2015.07.006 ENVDEV247

To appear in: Environmental Development Received date: 19 May 2015 Revised date: 19 July 2015 Accepted date: 20 July 2015 Cite this article as: Lidvard Grønnevet, The joint Russian-Norwegian governance of the Barents SEA LME Fisheries, Environmental Development, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envdev.2015.07.006 This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting galley proof before it is published in its final citable form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

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The Joint Russian-Norwegian Governance of the Barents Sea LME Fisheries.

Paper based on a presentation at the 3rd Global Large Marine Ecosystem (LME) Conference in Swakopmund, Namibia 8 – 10 October 2014. Lidvard Grønnevet, Senior Advisor, CDCF, Institute of Marine Research, Bergen, Norway Abstract: The Barents Sea is a rich fishing area with the biggest cod stock in the world. This stock is now in excellent conditions, producing record catches fully within safe and sustainable biological parameters. The spawning stock biomass of the main groundfish species has increased threefold over the last 15 years. The Barents Sea management is among the most successful management regimes of a major fishery area anywhere, and the focus of this paper is on the governance of the fisheries. The joint Russian-Norwegian governance over the last almost 40 years, through the Joint Fisheries Commission, is a major element in this successful result. The scientific cooperation is described and how it is now integrated into the work of the Commission. The development of long-term strategies for management of joint stocks is described, resulting in agreement on a set of "decision rules" and new regulatory decisions. The period of major problems with overfishing of quotas is described. The level and comprehensiveness of the cooperation is explained with a discussion of the present agreement, for 2015. The issues of zonal borders and the Svalbard Fishery Protection Zone are explained. The paper concludes with comments on the outlook for the future, considering the present situation in relation to developments in Crimea and Ukraine, and the resulting sanctions. Keywords: LMEs Fisheries management Norwegian - Soviet / Russian Cooperation Barents Sea Northeast Arctic Cod Zonal Borders

1. INTRODUCTION The Barents Sea is an important, rich fishing area. The Northeast Arctic cod stock (Gadus morhua – Atlantic cod) is the biggest cod stock in the world, and is the basis for the most important fishery in the Barents Sea. The coastal fishery for cod in the Lofoten area and along the Norwegian coast in the winter and spring spawning season has a history of more than a thousand years, as is documented in written sources from that time (Nielssen 2014). There is also a traditional spring fishery of immature cod along the coast of Finnmark and Murmansk (Hylen et al. 2008). The Barents Sea is defined as a Large Marine Ecosystem in the LME literature (LME Portal; Sherman 2014; Sherman et al. 2013). However, the Barents Sea is not connected to any LME project. The focus of this paper is on the governance of the fisheries in the Barents Sea, and as such reflects the Governance Module of the LME “model.” This module addresses the stakeholder participation and the adaptive management (Carlisle 2014; LME MODULES).

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Figure 1.1 LME Modules The Barents Sea has to be considered among the most successful managements regimes of a major fishery area anywhere in the world. The Northeast Arctic cod stock in the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea is now in excellent condition, producing record catches fully within safe and sustainable biological parameters as assessed in 2014 (ICES 2014 a). In the latest advice from ICES published in June 2015 the fishing pressure is assessed to be above the FMSY level (the level of fishing mortality corresponding to Maximum Sustainable Yield) and also above the target in the Commission Management Plan. The two other important ground fish species – haddock and saithe – are also in good condition, with stock levels at “full reproductive capacity” (ICES 2014 b; ICES 2014 c; ICES 2015 b; ICES 2015 c). Over the last 15 years, the spawning stock biomass of the main ground fish species in the Barents Sea has increased threefold.

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Figure 1.2. Spawning stock biomass of all main groundfish species (Atlantic cod, haddock and saithe). 1985-2014. (Figure 2A in Fiskeridirektoratet 2015). It is the joint Russian-Norwegian governance of the fisheries in the Barents Sea over the last almost 40 years that has caused this successful management outcome. In this paper we will look more closely at the governance of the Barents Sea, examining how it has developed over time as well as the present situation before concluding with some comments on possible expectations for the future.

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Figure 1.3. The Barents Sea bottom topography and geographical names. 2. BACKGROUND 2.1 The Barents Sea ecosystem (based on Bakketeig et al. 2015; IMR 2014) The Barents Sea is a rather shallow shelf ocean with an average depth of 230 meters. The size is 1.4 million square kilometers, and it is located north of the northern coast of Norway and north-west coast of Russia, between Svalbard to the west and Novaja Semlja to the east. It is characterized by major yearly variations in temperature and ice cover, because of the variations in quantity and temperature of the influx of Atlantic water. The Gulf Stream keeps the southern part of the Barents Sea free of ice all year round, and causes a rich biological production from plankton to marine mammals. The spawning of major fish stocks such as cod and herring occurs outside the Barents Sea, and the biological production is dependent of the transportation of eggs and larvae in the ocean currents into the Barents Sea. The Barents Sea also has one of the highest concentrations of sea birds in the world with 20 million individuals across nearly 40 species.

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Figure 2.1. Main characteristics of the circulation patterns and depth in the Barents Sea. (From Gradinger 2015). Water temperatures were above yearly average in 2014, but approached the long-term average during the year. High zooplankton abundances and biomass were observed west and north of Svalbard together with high abundances of large whales, specifically blue whales. First studies on microplastics showed their widespread occurrence in the stomachs of snow crabs (Gradinger 2015). There has been a temperature increase of about 0,8 º C in the North Atlantic over a 30-year period (Sundby 2015). This is not only caused by man-made climate changes, but is reinforced by long-term natural climate changes. The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report estimates the regional effects of global temperature changes. For the Barents Sea, the effect is expected to be the double of the global change, i.e. a global increase of 2ºC will cause a temperature increase in the Barents Sea of 4ºC (IPCC 2013). An additional factor in expected changes to the Barents Sea ecosystem is ocean acidification. The most recent 7 to 8 years have seen a cooling trend in the northeast Atlantic water. This agrees with earlier findings of a 60–70 year cycle of natural climate variability, which for the next quarter of a century may hide the predicted global heating due to greenhouse gases. If

6 this is correct, we will during the second half of this century experience a rapid heating to temperatures never experienced before, with unknown effects on the ecosystems (Svendsen 2015). 2.2 History of cod fishery – Development of regulations. The first regulations of the cod fishery were aimed at preventing conflicts between fishers operating on the same fishing grounds. Regulations for biological reasons were not introduced until the mid-20th century. In the 1930s, there was a focus on minimum trawl-mesh size and minimum landing fish size. A Convention on these regulations was agreed in London in 1937, but the start of World War II halted the ratification process (Sætersdal 2008). A new Convention signed in London in 1946 recommended increasing the mesh size to 110 mm. It came into force in April 1953, and the USSR acceded to the Convention in 1958 and ratified it in 1961. This was the first binding regulation measure in the history of the cod fishery in the Barents Sea (Yaragina et al. 2011). Some other measures were later introduced, but the introduction of effective comprehensive regulations came with the establishment of the Joint Norwegian-Soviet Fishery Commission. (For a comprehensive analysis of the development since 1970 see Gullestad et al. 2014.)

3. SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION (Based on Jakobsen and Ozhigin 2011. In particular chapter 1: Alekseev et al. 2011.) The start of the Russian-Norwegian cooperation in marine research can be traced back to the mid 19th century. During the period 1850 to 1914 there was a growing cooperation. At the end of the century, the Russian scientist Nikolay M. Knipovich discussed his plan for a scientific fishing expedition with the leading Norwegian scientists at the time – among them Fridtjof Nansen, Johan Hjort and Georg Ossian Sars. The Russian research and fishing vessel “Andrey Pervozvanny” visited Norway in 1899. “This was the first ever Russian research vessel and the first one in the world specially built for research and fishing studies.” (Alekseev et al. 2011, page 18). The cooperation between scientists from both countries expanded within the framework of ICES (International Council for the Exploration of the Sea) after its establishment in 1902. Russian participation in ICES ended with the outbreak of World War I, which also hindered bilateral cooperation. The political landscape was changed after the war, and the level of bilateral cooperation was low. The USSR’s expansion of its territorial waters from 3 to 12 nautical miles in 1921 closed the access for Norwegian sealers who had been hunting seals in the affected waters (the “East Ice”) for generations. After complex negotiations SovietNorwegian cooperation on seal hunting was established in 1923, and later a commission of experts on seal biology was established. This contributed to establishing good neighborly relations between the USSR and Norway even as practical cooperation was low. The USSR joined the ICES in 1955, and there was an exchange of visits of ministers of fisheries from Soviet and Norway in 1956. This started a new era of cooperation that has continued to this day. It was initiated by reciprocal visits by research vessels to Bergen and Murmansk in 1958. The arenas of cooperation have been developed and greatly expanded

7 over time and now consist of ICES meetings; Joint Scientific Meetings; Joint Science Symposia and Joint surveys. Since the establishment in 1976 of the “Joint Norwegian-Soviet Fisheries Commission” (since 1991 the “Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission”) scientific cooperation has been integrated into the work of the Commission. During this long period of scientific cooperation, the understanding and knowledge of the marine environment including fishery biology has developed enormously, and this has also influenced the bilateral cooperation. The Ecosystem Approach to fishery management is now generally accepted as a management principle. This is a definition proposed by a study group in ICES in 2000: “Integrated management of human activities based on knowledge of ecosystem dynamics to achieve sustainable use of ecosystem goods and services, and maintenance of ecosystem integrity.” (ICES 2000). The cooperation has consequently developed from a focus on the most commercially valuable species of fish, shellfish and marine mammals to a broad biodiversity focus (Misund et al. 2011). From 2003 a joint autumn ecosystem survey has been carried out. Throughout the cooperation, the core institutions have been PINRO (Knipovich Polar Research Institute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanography) in Murmansk and IMR (Institute of Marine Research) in Bergen. “At present, the joint scientific study of the Barents Sea is one of the most successful examples of scientific cooperation in Europe, and quite possibly, anywhere in the world.” (Jakobsen and Ozhigin 2011. Page 9). The cooperation is now also based on the precautionary approach to fishery management – see section 5 (see also Hammer and Hoel 2012).

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JOINT NORWEGIAN-RUSSIAN FISHERIES COMMISSION

4.1 Overview The Joint Norwegian-Soviet Fisheries Commission (Website: http://www.jointfish.com/ ) met for the first time in Moscow at the end of January 1976. The issue of zonal borders was not part of the work of the Commission, but influenced and was important for the work of the Commission. Already during the second meeting at the end of 1976 there was agreement on granting reciprocal fishing rights in the respective zones. The questions of fishing quotas were also raised, and a TAC for cod was agreed. Agreement was reached on the distribution of shares of the three most important species; with 50/50 for cod and haddock and 60/40 Norway/USSR for capelin. From 1979 onwards the Commission usually met once a year – at the end of each year – to agree on the fishery for the following year. During the 80s there was disagreement on the approach to regulations. Norway favored stronger rules on gear and minimum fish size, while USSR favored lower quotas and restrictions during the Norwegian coastal spawning fishery. From the outset the Norwegian fishery with so called “passive gear” (handlines, longlines, gillnet and Danish seine) had been allowed to continue even after the TAC had been reached. This resulted in overfishing of the quotas in the years after 1980 when the total cod stock declined as a result of smaller year

8 classes from the middle of the 70s. Some restriction on the Lofoten cod fishery was introduced by Norway during these years, and it was finally agreed to end the exemption for “passive gear” in 1989. That followed a dramatic decline of the cod stock the previous years. In June 1988 the Commission met in an extraordinary session in Moscow and agreed to a reduction of 22% of the quota for cod for that year. That summer the Norwegian Institute of Marine Research concluded that the spawning stock of cod was the smallest it had been for 120 years. It was agreed in December 1988 to reduce the quota to 300 000 tons, and at the end of 1989 the lowest-ever quota was agreed at 160 000 tons. This was a turning point, and the cod stock improved after that with resulting higher quotas. In 1992 the cod quota was even increased in the middle of the year. In 1997 the quota was set at 850 000 tons, with a reduction the following years. During this period, the management focus changed to a goal of reaching a long-term spawning stock biomass of 500 000 tons. In the protocol from the meeting in 1999 the phrase “precautionary approach” is used for the first time. In November 2002 the Commission agreed on unified long-term strategies for management of joint stocks in the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea (NFD 2015 a). This was a breakthrough for a long-term management strategy in the fishery cooperation. This meant an intention to even out the quota fluctuation from year to year, while simultaneously attempting to keep the average fishing mortality at the precautionary level in running three-year periods. The agreement on the strategy was based on a document made by a working group: “Basic document regarding the main principles and criteria for long term, sustainable management of living marine resources in the Barents and Norwegian seas” (NFD 2003). The parties set “decision rules” (harvest control rules) for the annual fishing quotas for cod and haddock. The objective was to rebuild the spawning stock of cod to the Bpa level (the precautionary reference point for the spawning stock biomass) and to get the fishing mortality down to the level Fpa=0.42 (the precautionary reference point for fishing mortality (at defined age range)), as this was defined in 2002. This long-term management strategy for the fishery in the Barents Sea has now been further developed. The current management plan was agreed to in November 2009 and it will be evaluated in 2015 (ICES 2014 a, ICES 2015 a). The precautionary reference point for fishing mortality is now defined by ICES to Fpa=0.40 (ICES 2015 a). 4.2 Function The Russian Federation assumed the international responsibilities of the USSR when it expired at the end of 1991. The Commission continued as the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission and continued the numbering of the sessions from the Soviet time. The political and economic changes that then happened also had considerable influence on the work of the Commission. Changes inside Russia resulted in decentralization also within the fishery sector. Regional interests within Russia gained a much stronger influence on the work of the Commission. This led to an increase in the number of people participating in the meetings of the Commission from the Russian side. At the outset the usual number in each delegation had been around 20. At the meeting in Murmansk in 1999, the Russian delegation had 50 members (Hønneland 2006, page 62). Also the Norwegian delegation had grown in numbers. Jørn Krog assumed the position as leader of the Norwegian delegation at the

9 meeting in 1999, after being appointed to the position of Permanent Secretary at the Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries. He found the situation rather difficult (Krog 2015): “My first session was sheer anarchy. When industry interests and local politicians, especially from the Russian side, get too involved into the decision-making process in the negotiations, it bungles the cooperation. (…) After the delegations became more orderly it became easier to work long term.” The same description of the development in the 1990s is given by Hønneland in a recent opinion article (Hønneland 2015): “The development in Russian fisheries management since the early 1990s follows to an astonishing degree the overall policy trends in the country. Yeltsin Russia's political and economic chaos manifested itself to a high degree also in the fisheries sector. ( ….. )When Putin came to power in 2000, the party was over.” In November 1992 it was agreed to appoint a working group to look at possible ways to improve the control within fishing (Hønneland 2006, page 52). The group presented 18 proposals in May 1993. It was followed by the first direct meeting in June 1993 between the control authorities in Norway and Russia. In November 1993 it was agreed to make the working group a permanent body (quoted from Hønneland 2006, page 54. Translated from Norwegian): “a permanent committee for management and control issues with the purpose of treating these questions in the periods between sessions of the Commission”. This “permanent committee” has since performed an important function in the work of the Commission. Also during the actual meetings of the Commission the work is now carried out in a number of working groups that work in parallel to the negotiations by the leaders of the delegations. During the 1990s, largely initiated by the work in the “permanent committee”, a string of new regulatory decisions was agreed by the Commission. Most important was the requirement to have sorting grids in shrimp and cod trawls and the use of satellite tracking, implemented from 2000. Also during the 1990s harmonization between Norway and Russia of a number of management undertakings already implemented in each country took place. Most important was common conversion factors from live weight to product weights, as well as the procedures for closing and opening of fishing grounds with high concentrations of juvenile fish or illegal levels of by-catches. 4.3 Overfishing After 2000 Russian overfishing occurred. This happened in a number of ways, mostly through non-registration of catches and trans-shipment of catches at sea. There was a joint effort through the Commission to document and stop this illegal fishing. A number of methods were used to document what is called “registered” overfishing. The latest published report from the working group on overfishing documents the development during the years 2002 through 2008 (Fiskeridirektoratet 2009).

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Figure 4.1. Registered Russian overfishing of cod during the years 2002-2008. The overfishing constituted a large share in relation to the allocated Russian quota.

Figure 4.2. Overfishing of cod as a percentage of the Russian quotas for the years 2002-2008. For 2008 the Russian overfishing was down to 8%, and that was the last year with such overfishing. During the years 2009 through 2014 no illegal overfishing was registered (NFD 2015 b), and no unreported landings are included in the catch information used by ICES (ICES 2014 a, ICES 2015 a). The quantities of “unreported landings” used by ICES vary in some years from the quantities used by the Commission working group on overfishing.

11 Measures implemented by NEAFC (North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission) also had an important part in eliminating the overfishing (Stokke, O. S. 2010). 4.4 Present Agreement for 2015 – Protocol of the 44th session of the Commission The meeting took place in Oslo during 7 – 10 October 2014. Norway and Russia agreed total quotas for 2015 for common stocks in the Barents Sea and the distribution between Norway, Russia and the share to third countries. The parties also agreed reciprocal rights to fishing in each other's zones and agreed to trade quotas of both common stocks and nationally regulated stocks. Both cod and haddock in the Barents Sea have been on an extremely high level the last few years. After the allocation of the quotas to third countries the two stocks are shared equally between Norway and Russia. The third country quotas are used by each side in exchanges with other countries of quotas on other fish stocks. The TAC for cod in 2015 is set at 894 000 tons which is a reduction by 12% from 2014, but is still at a high level historically. The quota for haddock was kept on same level as in 2014, at 178 500 tons. On the 10 of June 2015 – in the form of a Supplementary Protocol to the 44th session Norway and Russia agreed to increase the haddock quota for 2015 to 223 000 tons. The reason for the increase is a reevaluation of the haddock stock by ICES. (NFD 2015 c) In the latest advice from ICES published in June 2015 the cod TAC for 2016 is set at 805 000 tons and the TAC for haddock in 2016 at 223 000 tons. (ICES 2015 a; ICES 2015 b) Norway and Russia agreed to introduce quota flexibility up to 10% between calendar years in the fishery for cod and haddock, and this is new for 2015. Also, for the first time an agreement was reached on TAC and distribution of deep sea redfish (sebastes mentella) in the Barents Sea. The total quota is set at 30 000 tons, and divided by 72% to Norway, 18% to Russia and 10% to third countries. The volume and comprehensiveness of the agreement for 2015 can be seen as an indication on the level and extent of the cooperation. The agreement consists of the “Protocol” (18 pages) and 16 annexes (total of 97 pages). In addition to cod and haddock the Commission is setting quotas and/or some regulatory measures for capelin (Mallotus villosus), Greenland halibut (Reinhardtius hippoglossoides), redfish (sebastes mentella), saithe (Pollachius virens), Kamchatka crab (Paralithodes camtschaticus), shrimp (Pandalus borealis) and seals (Phoca groenlandica).

5.

ZONAL BORDER AND SVALBARD FISHERY PROTECTION ZONE1

5.1 UNCLOS – EEZ The ocean law process within the context of the UN resulted in 1958 in establishing 12 nautical miles as the general fishery limit. However, the development of vessel and catch technology proved this not to be enough for establishing effecting management systems. The third UN Ocean Law Conference agreed in 1975 to extend the national jurisdiction to 200 1

Based mainly on Christensen 2014, Hønneland 2006 and Tamnes 1997.

12 nautical miles with Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). The formal Convention (UNCLOS) was signed in 1982 and entered into force in 1994, but the principle of 200 nautical miles EEZ was accepted as international customary law already at the end of the 1970s. Norway established the EEZ from 1st of January 1977, and the USSR established an EEZ in the Barents Sea about at the same time. With the extension of the maritime borders to 200 nautical miles two problems appeared in the Barents Sea. There was no agreement between the Soviet Union and Norway on how to draw the border between the two zones. Also, the 200 nautical mile zones from the coasts of USSR, Norway and Svalbard left open a triangle shaped area of about 62 400 square kilometers. This triangle area was called the “Loop Hole”. 5.2 The “Loop Hole”

Fig. 5.1 The “Loop Hole”. Source: UD 2014 b. Since this area was outside the 200 nautical mile zones, no regulation of fishery there was in place. The distribution of cod to the Loop Hole area varies considerably from year to year. In the beginning of the 1990s a fishery for cod developed in this area by vessels from Greenland, Panama, the Faeroes, France, Germany and Iceland. This fishery met with strong criticism from the fishing industry both in Russia and Norway. The UN Fish Stock Agreement from 1995 established principles for how to solve such a problem of non-regulated fishery outside and adjacent to the EEZ. However, the Agreement left any practical solution to the possible set-up of a regional cooperation entity to be decided between the relevant coastal states and the foreign fishing nations. There was no interest from the two coastal states in establishing

13 such an entity as there already was a well-established management regime for the Barents Sea fisheries from 1975 and 1976. Instead the problem was solved by different means. The practical fishing operation in the Loop Hole was hindered by blocking both call on Norwegian ports and landing of catch. In addition the vessels involved in the unregulated fishery were “blacklisted”, i.e. denied regular licenses and quotas in the Norwegian EEZ that would also be valid for the vessel after change of flag or ownership. This had the effect of sharply reducing the second-hand value of such vessels. The other track was to open negotiations with Iceland on the fishery in the “Loop Hole”. An agreement on such fishery was already entered into between Norway and Greenland in 1991. Russia was invited into the negotiations with Iceland, and an Agreement was reached in April 1999. Iceland achieved quotas in the Barents Sea from Russia and Norway in exchange for quotas for these two countries in the Icelandic Zone. Iceland committed itself to hinder all unregulated fishery in the Barents Sea and also in the Svalbard zone.

5.3 The ”Grey Zone” The maritime border and the fishery border close to the coast between the USSR and Norway had been agreed around 1960 (UD 2007). The development of the international ocean law in the 1970s triggered the need for delimitation of the continental shelf and the fishery zones. Initiatives for such an agreement had started earlier, at the end of the 1960s. However, the two countries had principally different views on how this should be done. Norway adhered to the mid-line principle, as established during the Ocean Law conference of 1958. The Soviet Union had already in 1926 passed a Decree claiming the sector principle for the sovereignty of the areas of the north. That is, that the maritime border should be a “sector line” drawn from the border at the coast directly to the North Pole. The difference in views resulted in a huge disputed area of 175 0000 square kilometers. It should also be noted that this disputed area contained a number of important fishing grounds (“fishing banks”): The East Bank, Tiddly Bank, Skolpen Bank and Thor Iversen Bank.

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Fig. 5.2 The Grey Zone: dotted line (Source: UD 2010, page 3) It proved impossible to agree on delimitation before the establishment of extended economic Zones/Fishery Zones at 1st of January 1977. Consequently there was a need to establish a temporary practical arrangement for control of the fishing in the area. The result was an agreement in June 1977 to establish what became known as “The Gray Zone”. It was formally approved by both parties in the beginning of 1978, and was later renewed every year by both parties through changing regimes. The negotiations to reach a permanent solution continued, but proved to be very difficult until April 2010. During a visit to Oslo by president Medvedev the agreement of a compromise was announced in a joint statement. The solution was to divide the disputed area in to equal parts, each of about 87 000 square kilometers. The formal signing of the agreement took place 15th September 2010, and it entered into force on 7th July 2011 after ratification by both parties. This agreement is very important, because in addition to establishing the border, it confirms the continuation of the good neighborly relations both related to fishing and to petroleum exploitation.

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Fig. 5.3 Map illustrating the Agreement on the Zonal border (Source: UD 2010, page 20). 5.4 The Svalbard Fishery Protection Zone. Norway gained sovereignty over Svalbard through the Svalbard Treaty of 1920. The treaty established specific obligations for Norway related to the archipelago, most importantly the

16 equal treatment related to certain activities for citizens and companies of the States that are party to the Treaty. Some of these obligations are also valid for the territorial waters extending to 12 nautical miles. Following the acceptance through international customary law of the right to establishment of EEZ Norway established in 1977 a “Fishery Protection Zone” of 200 nautical miles around Svalbard. The Norwegian view is that the specific obligation for equal treatment at Svalbard is limited to the mainland and the territorial water; however, there is no general international acceptance of this view. Norway decided to make the established fishery regulations within this zone non-discriminatory to vessels from states with a history of fishing in the area. Since 1977 this compromise has worked in practical terms even if there is no agreement on the principle legal basis for the zone. The compromise has also worked in practical terms related to the joint governance with Russia of the fisheries in the Barents Sea (Christensen 2014). Some incidents have occurred – e.g. the “Elektron” case – and there is probably still a potential for problems to arise. Wording in the protocol for 2015 illustrates how the intention of both parties is to avoid such problems (NFD 2015 a. Page 1 of the Protocol). 6. TRADE AND MARKET Russia developed into a very important market for Norwegian fish products after the end of the Soviet Union. In 2012 and 2013 Russia was the most important market for Norwegian fish export with export of 295 000 tons in 2013 with a value of NOK 6,5 billion (more than 1 billion USD). The most important products were salmon and trout with 81% of the market share (Norwegian Seafood Council 2014). The developments in Ukraine and Crimea during 2014 had a strong effect on the relationship between Russia and other countries, particularly in Europe. Along with the allied countries in NATO and in partnership with the EU, Norway condemned the Russian actions and it was stated that failure to end violations of international law would have serious consequences. Restrictive measures against Russia were introduced also by Norway. As a reaction Russia on August 7, 2014 announced a ban on food imports. The sanctions also included Norway and the seafood sector. This caused great uncertainty in the Norwegian fishing industry. However, the result turned out not to be as bad as had been feared. Some products still entered Russia through third countries and the export was redirected to other markets. For the year 2014, the total Norwegian fish export increased by 12% to NOK 68.8 billion (about 10 billion USD). The export to Russia was NOK 3.4 billion in 2014 – a reduction of 48% from 2013 (Norwegian Seafood Council 2015). 7. OUTLOOK The Norwegian government’s view of the situation in relation to developments in Crimea, Ukraine and Russia has been stated many times over the last months. In the proposal for the State Budget for 2015 published on 8th October 2014 (UD 2014 a, page 15), the Norwegian government referred to the “Barents Cooperation” and the close cross-border cooperation as important elements in the bilateral relation between Norway and Russia. The declaration agreed at the 20 year jubilee of the “Barents Cooperation” (Barents Summit 2013) was referred to as “future oriented”. However, it is also clearly stated that “Through the unlawful

17 annexation of the Crimea and the persistent interference in Ukraine's internal affairs, Russia has violated fundamental principles of international law and challenged the established order for relations between states” (UD 2014 a, page 15). The general policy is stated as a wish to continue the established cooperation as far as possible. “Norway will continue to be a predictable neighbor with a consistent bilateral policy, based on international law. We want to continue the good contact that already exists between our two peoples and develop the bilateral relations further. The cooperation within responsible resource management, environment and fisheries cooperation, cultural cooperation and education- and research cooperation will be continued.” (UD 2014 a, page 15). This policy is in line with established policy since 2005, when the northern area was made the most important strategic focus in the Norwegian foreign policy. This policy is also detailed in the White paper to the Storting (Parliament) no. 7 from 2011 (UD 2011). 7.1 Policy statements 2015 The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Børge Brende has expressed his view on the bilateral relations between Norway and Russia many times.    

Arctic Frontiers 2015; January 19th (UD 2015 a ). Kirkeneskonferansen 2015; February 4th (UD 2015 b). Utenrikspolitisk redegjørelse; March 5th (UD 2015 c). Economist Arctic Summit Oslo 2015; March 12th (UD 2015 d).

On all these occasions the same general view has been expressed, that Norway is aligned with its allies in NATO and other countries in reacting to the situation in Crimea and Ukraine. But at the same time Norway wants to continue the established cooperation as far as possible. Recently this view is expressed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Børge Brende in the newspaper VG on April 10th (VG 2015): “(…) Russia's violations of international law have also broken down basic trust. We cannot fail to react to Russia's unacceptable behavior towards Ukraine. Norway has responded by condemning the illegal annexation, reduce contacts at political level, suspends military cooperation and endorses the restrictive measures which the EU and a number of other countries have introduced. We stand together with our allies and our partners in Europe in our reaction. Collaboration continues. Independent of the political situation Russia remains our neighbor. We therefore continue the cooperation with Russia in many areas. It is important for the neighborhood relations. We especially emphasize preserving cooperation on the responsible management of fish resources in the northern ocean areas, on nuclear safety, on environmental protection and on search and rescue at sea. We still want a good and constructive cooperation whenever possible. However, it is not the time today to return to a "normal" bilateral relationship to Russia. Then Russia first must change its policy. (…)”

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8. CONCLUSION Throughout their history, the neighborly relations between Norway and Russia have been very good and peaceful. The so called “pomor” trade with Russians selling grain and buying fish in Norway continued for many hundreds of years until it was halted in 1917 after the Russian revolution. During the Cold War, Norway and Russia were on opposite sides and this influenced the overall relationship and fed into development of reciprocal suspicion. Gradually, cooperation in the fisheries sector developed from the 1950s, as described above. Why this did happen and how was this possible across the great divide during the Cold War? A number of factors have probably contributed. The border is short – only 196 km, the area is sparsely populated and it is far away from the important centers of power in Moscow and Oslo (Nilsen 2015). Former Norwegian ambassador to Moscow Øyvind Nordsletten thinks the good relations are influenced by the earlier history (Nordsletten 2015). The central power saw few strategic interests in the area. Norway acknowledged the special relationship with USSR. No permanent NATO bases were established and no nuclear weapons were stored by NATO on Norwegian soil. No military exercises with forces from other NATO members were held in the county of Finnmark bordering on the USSR. After the Cold War the historical good neighborly relations and the generally positive impression of each other across the border helped to solve the conflicts that arose, exemplified by the Russian reaction to the “Elektron” case. At the regional level a good cooperation was developed from the 1990s with the “Barents Cooperation” despite the great differences across the border. The difference across the Norway and Russia border is comparable to the border between USA and Mexico (See HDI 2014). The fishery sector particularly in the 1970s saw a revolutionary development in ocean law. This “forced” the two parties to cooperate. They had the responsibility to do so through the new requirements in the Law of the Sea. There was also a fundamental interest from both parties to protect the living resources and improving the management to the benefit of both. In the beginning of the cooperation the high-level ocean border conflicts overshadowed the fishery cooperation. When these border issues were resolved into practical workable compromises – e.g. by establishing the Grey Zone – the fishery cooperation could move forward. This also paralleled great changes in the understanding and development of fishery biology and management through focus on exploitation level and fishing mortality displayed in the work inside ICES from the mid 1970s (See Gullestad et al., 2014, page 177). With the end of the Cold War, the fishery cooperation could continue to develop. The evolution of the management framework and the changing attitudes had direct influence of developments in the Joint Commission in direction of a coherent policy to prevent overfishing and secure long term sustainability and introduction of the Ecosystem Approach (Misund et al. 2011). As described above the improvement in technology also pointed in the same directions. The understanding of the need for a rational economic management of the fisheries also gained support with the realization that it was not enough to regulate the total quota and the exploitation pattern. To gain the full potential benefit from the resources the catch also had to

19 be utilized in an economic efficient manner. This led to the need for comprehensive management, and subsequently also the understanding that control of the actual regulations was fundamental to successful outcomes. As described in this paper the joint governance of the fishery in the Barents Sea has developed over time and across overarching political divisions into to a management system with close collaboration between biologists, managers, stakeholders and control authorities. Hopefully this can serve as a good example for other areas – also to LME projects. Can the joint governance of the Barents Sea continue through the present chilling of the relations to Russia? The hope from the Norwegian side seems to be that this should be possible. As expressed by the Foreign Minister: We still want a good and constructive cooperation whenever possible. We can hope that the factors mentioned above that made the cooperation possible during the Cold War can help make this a reality. References Alekseev, A., Bjordal, Å., Røttingen, I., Zilanov, V. K. and Shevelev, M. S. 2011. Cooperation in marine research. In Jakobsen, T. J., and Ozhigin, V. K. (Eds) 2011. Barents Sea, ecosystem, resources, management. Half a century of Russian–Norwegian cooperation, Tapir Academic Press, Trondheim 2011. Bakketeig, I. E., Gjøsæter, H., Hauge M., Sunnset, B. H. and Toft, K. Ø. (Eds) 2015. Havforskningsrapporten 2015. Fisken og havet, særnr. 1–2015. (Institute of Marine Research. The “Marine Research Report 2015 – published March 20, 2015.) http://www.imr.no/publikasjoner/andre_publikasjoner/havforskningsrapporten/nb-no Barents Summit. 2013. Declaration on the 20th Anniversary of the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation (Kirkenes, Norway, 3–4 June 2013) Prime Ministers and other high-level representatives of the members of the Barents EuroArctic Council, i.e. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the European Union. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/nordomrc3a5dene/barentssamarb eidet/barentssummitdeclaration2013.pdf Carlisle, K. 2014. The Large Marine Ecosystem approach: Application of an integrated, modular strategy in projects supported by the Global Environment Facility. Environmental Development 11 (2014) 19–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envdev.2013.10.003 Christensen, P. 2014. Chapter 2: EF-strid og 200 mils økonomisk sone; and chapter 3: Havnåm og diplomati. In Kolle, N. 2014. Norges Fiskeri og Kysthistorie. (The Norwegian Fishery and Coastal History) Volume IV. Fagbokforlaget 2014 Fiskeridirektoratet. 2015. (Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries). Economic and biological figures from Norwegian fisheries – 2014. ISBN: 82-92075-07-0 http://www.fiskeridir.no/Yrkesfiske/Statistikk-yrkesfiske/Statistiskepublikasjoner/Noekkeltall-for-de-norske-fiskeriene Fiskeridirektoratet. 2009. (Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries). Status report for 2008. Russian catches of north east arctic cod and haddock.

20 http://www.fiskeridir.no/fiske-og-fangst/rapporter-utredninger/russland/russisk-fangst-avtorsk-og-hyse-og-omlasting-paa-havet Gullestad, P., Aglen, A., Bjordal, A., Blom, G., Johansen, S., Krog, J., Misund, O. A., and Røttingen, I. 2014. Changing attitudes 1970–2012: evolution of the Norwegian management framework to prevent overfishing and to secure long-term sustainability. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 71: 173–182. ICES Journal of Marine Science (2014), 71(2), 173–182. doi:10.1093/icesjms/fst094 Gradinger, R., 2015. Status for økosystemene i Barentshavet og Polhavet (Status of the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean ecosystems). Page 85 – 87 in Bakketeig, I. E., Gjøsæter, H., Hauge, M., Sunnset, B. H. and Toft, K. Ø. (Eds.) 2015. Havforskningsrapporten 2015. Fisken og havet, særnr. 1–2015. Hammer, M. and Hoel, A. H. 2012. The Development of Scientific Cooperation under the Norway–Russia Fisheries Regime in the Barents Sea. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, vol. 3, 2/2012 pp. 244–274. ISSN 1891-6252 HDI 2014. Human Development Report 2014. By the United Nations Development Programme. 1 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA Hylen, A., Nakken, O. and Nedreaas, K. Northeast Arctic cod: fisheries, life history, stock fluctuations and management. In Nakken, O. 2008. (Ed) Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring and Northeast Arctic Cod. 100 years of Research and Management, Tapir Academic Press, Trondheim 2008. (Page 83) Hønneland, G. 2006. Kvotekamp og kystsolidaritet: Norsk–Russisk Fiskeriforvaltning gjennom 30 år, Fagbokforlaget Vigmostad & Bjørke AS, Bergen 2006 Hønneland, G. 2015. FiskeribladetFiskaren, April 17, 2015, page 42. Opinion article, quote translated from Norwegian. IPCC 2013. As referred in Sundby 2015. Regional differences in temperatures per 1 º C change in global temperature. Source: Figure 12.10 in Collins, M. et al., 2013: Long-term Climate Change: Projections, Commitments and Irreversibility. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. ICES. 2000. REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING. ICES Headquarters 8–12 May 2000. ICES CM 2000/E:09 ICES. 2014 a. ICES Advice 2014, Book 3. 3.3.2 Advice June 2014. ECOREGION Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea. STOCK Cod in Subareas I and II (Northeast Arctic cod). Advice for 2015. http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2014/2014/cod-arct.pdf ICES. 2014 b. ICES Advice 2014, Book 3. 3.3.4 Advice June 2014 ECOREGION Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea. STOCK Haddock in Subareas I and II (Northeast Arctic)

21 http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2014/2014/had-arct.pdf ICES. 2014 c. ICES Advice 2014, Book 3. 3.3.8 Advice June 2014 ECOREGION Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea STOCK Saithe in Subareas I and II (Northeast Arctic) http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2014/2014/sai-arct.pdf ICES. 2015 a. ICES Advice 2015, Book 3. 3.3.4 Cod (Gadus morhua) in Subareas I and II (Northeast Arctic). Published 12 June 2015. http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2015/2015/cod-arct.pdf ICES. 2015 b. ICES Advice 2015, Book 3. 3.3.8 Haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus) in Subareas I and II (Northeast Arctic). Published 12 June 2015. http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2015/2015/had-arct.pdf ICES. 2015 c. ICES Advice 2015, Book 3. 3.3.10 Saithe (Pollachius virens) in Subareas I and II (Northeast Arctic). Published 12 June 2015 . http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2015/2015/sai-arct.pdf IMR. 2014. Institute of Marine Research. Fakta om Barentshavet. http://www.imr.no/nyhetsarkiv/2014/august/skal_undersoke_barentshavet_fra_a_til_a/nb-no Jakobsen, T. J., and Ozhigin, V. K. (Eds) 2011. Barents Sea, ecosystem, resources, management. Half a century of Russian–Norwegian cooperation, Tapir Academic Press, Trondheim 2011. Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission. Website: http://www.jointfish.com/ Nielssen, A. R. 2014. Part 3: Markedsretting og nasjonal betydning av fiskeriene 1000-1350, pp. 194-198, 261. In Kolle, N. 2014. Norges Fiskeri og Kysthistorie. (The Norwegian Fishery and Coastal History) Volume I. Fagbokforlaget 2014 Krog, J. 2015. FiskeribladetFiskaren, February 27, 2015. Interview, translated from Norwegian. Pages 1, 16 – 18. LME MODULES: http://lme.edc.uri.edu/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=48 &Itemid=79 LME Portal: http://lme.edc.uri.edu/ Misund et al. 2011. Misund, O. A., Lepesevich, Y. M. and Filin, A. A. in Jakobsen and Ozhigin 2011. Jakobsen, T. J., and Ozhigin, V. K. (Eds) 2011. Barents Sea, ecosystem, resources, management. Half a century of Russian–Norwegian cooperation, Tapir Academic Press, Trondheim 2011. NFD 2015 a. Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries) Website on international fisheries cooperation/ Norway Russian cooperation: https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/tema/mat-fiske-og-landbruk/fiske-og-havbruk/ryddeinternasjonalt/fiskerisamarbeidet-med-russland/id376440/

22 NFD 2015 b. Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries). Meld. St. 15 (2014–2015) Noregs fiskeriavtalar for 2015 og fisket etter avtalane i 2013 og 2014. Tilråding frå Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet 20. mars 2015. (White paper to the Parliament March 20, 2015) https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumenter/meld.-st.-15-2014-2015/id2401636/ NFD 2015 c. Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries). Auke i hysekvoten for 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/auke-i-hysekvoten-for-2015/id2416253/ NFD 2003. Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries) Report of the Basic Document Working Group to The Joint Norwegian-Russian Fishery Commission, autumn 2003. Final, October 2003. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/kilde/fid/prm/2003/0076/ddd/pdfv/192765vedlegg_11_-basic_document.pdf Nilsen, J. P. Quoted in the newspaper Dag og Tid. March 6th 2015 page 9. Nordsletten, Ø. Quoted in the newspaper Dag og Tid. March 6th 2015 page 9. Norwegian Seafood Council 2014. Press release. http://en.seafood.no/News-and-media/Newsarchive/Press-releases/Import-ban-on-Norwegian-seafood Norwegian Seafood Council 2015. Press release. http://www.seafood.no/Nyheter-ogmedia/Nyhetsarkiv/Pressemeldinger/%E2%80%8B2014-ble-et-jubel%C3%A5r-for-norsksj%C3%B8mateksport Sherman, K., Belkin, I., Friedland, K.D., O'Reilly, J. 2013. Changing states of North Atlantic large marine ecosystems. Environmental Development 7 (2013) 43–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envdev.2013.05.004 Sherman, K. 2014. Toward ecosystem-based management (EBM) of the world's large marine ecosystems during climate change. Environmental Development 11 (2014) 46–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envdev.2014.04.006 Stokke, O.S. 2010. Barents Sea Fisheries - the IUU Struggle. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, vol. 1, (2) p. 207-224. Sundby, S. 2015. Da blir det for varmt for torsk og hyse. (Climate change impacts on marine ecosystems). Pages 137 – 139 in Bakketeig, I. E., Gjøsæter, H., Hauge, M., Sunnset, B. H. and Toft, K. Ø. (Eds.) 2015. Havforskningsrapporten 2015. Fisken og havet, særnr. 1–2015. Svendsen, E. 2015. Naturlig klimasvingning kan holde havoppvarmingen I sjakk – men bare de neste 20-30 årene. (Natural climate variability may hide greenhouse gas heating.) Pages 140 – 141 in Bakketeig, I. E., Gjøsæter, H., Hauge, M., Sunnset, B. H. and Toft, K. Ø. (Eds.) 2015. Havforskningsrapporten 2015. Fisken og havet, særnr. 1–2015. Sætersdal, G. 2008. In Nakken, O. 2008. (Ed) Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring and Northeast Arctic Cod. 100 years of Research and Management, Tapir Academic Press, Trondheim 2008. (Page 30).

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Tamnes, R. 1997. Oljealder 1965 – 1995. Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie. Bind 6. Oslo. Universitetsforlaget AS 1997. UD 2007. Utenriksdepartementet. 2007. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) St.prp. nr. 3 2007– 2008 Om samtykke til ratifikasjon av overenskomst av 11. juli 2007 mellom Norge og Russland om den maritime avgrensning i Varangerfjordområdet. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumenter/stprp-nr-3-2007-2008/id488644/?docId=STP200720080003000DDDEPIS&ch=1&q=Varangerfjordomr%C3%A5d et.&redir=true&ref=search&term=Varangerfjordomr%C3%A5det UD 2010. Utenriksdepartementet. 2010. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Prop. 43 S (2010– 2011). Samtykke til ratifikasjon av overenskomst av 15. september 2010 mellom Norge og Russland om maritim avgrensning og samarbeid i Barentshavet og Polhavet. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumenter/prop-43-s-20102011/id626419/ UD 2011. Utenriksdepartementet. 2011. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Meld. St. 7 (2011– 2012) Nordområdene – Visjon og virkemidler. (White paper to the Parliament November 18, 2011) https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/a0140460a8d04e4ba9c4af449b5fa06d/no/pdfs/stm2 01120120007000dddpdfs.pdf UD 2014 a. Utenriksdepartementet. 2014. Prop. 1 S (2014–2015) for budsjettåret 2015. (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Budget proposal for 2015. Published October 8th 2014.) https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumenter/Prop-1-S-20142015/id2005471/?ref=search&term= UD 2014 b. Utenriksdepartementet. 2014. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Havrettsspørsmål i nord. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/tema/utenrikssaker/folkerett/havrettssporsmal-inord/id479036/ UD 2015 a. Speech at Arctic Frontiers 2015, Tromsø. January 19th 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/aktuelt/arctic_innlegg/id2362601/ UD 2015 b. Speech at Kirkeneskonferansen, Kirkenes. February 4th 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/aktuelt/kirkenes_innlegg/id2394190/ UD 2015 c. Utenriksdepartementet. 2015. Utenrikspolitisk redegjørelse 5. mars 2015. Stortinget. (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Policy address. The Parliament, 5 March 2015. Translation from the Norwegian) https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/address_storting/id2398550/ UD 2015 d. Speech at Economist Arctic Summit Oslo 2015, Oslo. March 12th 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/aktuelt/economist-arctic-summit/id2400143/

24 VG 2015. Opinion article by Minster of Foreign Affairs Børge Brende in the newspaper Verdens Gang. April 10th 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/aktuelt/innlegg_russland/id2405437/ Yaragina, N. A., Aglen, A. and Sokolov, K. M. 2011. In Jakobsen, T. J., and Ozhigin, V. K. 2011. Barents Sea, ecosystem, resources, management. Half a century of Russian–Norwegian cooperation, Tapir Academic Press, Trondheim 2011. (Page 249)

Highlights The Joint Russian-Norwegian Governance of the Barents Sea LME Fisheries. The Barents Sea is a rich fishing area with the biggest cod stock in the world. The Northeast Arctic cod stock is in excellent condition, producing record catches fully within safe and sustainable biological parameters. The spawning stock biomass of the main groundfish species has increased threefold over the last 15 years. The Barents Sea is among the most successful management regimes of a major fishery area anywhere. The joint Russian - Norwegian governance over the last almost 40 years, through the Joint Fisheries Commission, is a major element in this successful result. The scientific cooperation developed more than 50 years ago, and is essential for the successful outcome. The management cooperation has advanced to the development of long-term strategies and agreement on a set “decision rules” for management of joint stocks. The problem with a period of major overfishing of quotas was solved through joint efforts by control authorities from both parties. The issues of disagreement on zonal borders and the Svalbard Fishery Protection Zone were solved through long term diplomatic efforts. Conclusion with comments on the outlook for the future, considering the present chilling in the bilateral relations.